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Subjective Status, Depression, and Neuroticism 
Cristina Vitouchanskaia 
Subjective status refers to the way in which individuals perceive themselves in 
relation to others in society, in terms of social status. Lower subjective status has been 
linked to poorer health outcomes, particularly depression. Individuals with lower 
subjective status report more symptoms of depression, even when their objective socio-
economic status (i.e., education, occupation, and income) is taken into account. Previous 
research has largely ignored individuals' personality differences, particularly individuals' 
level of neuroticism, when looking at the relation between subjective status and 
depression. Neuroticism is a core personality characteristic that negatively impacts many 
different areas of life. Individuals with higher neuroticism are more likely to report 
symptoms of depression. In addition, individuals with higher neuroticism have lower 
socio-economic status and poorer health, factors which may influence their subjective 
status. In light of such observations, the aim of the present research was to determine 
whether neuroticism plays a role in the relation between subjective status and depression. 
Participants were 371 retirees participating in a longitudinal study on life adjustment after 
retirement. Cross-sectional analysis of the data indicated that individuals with lower 
subjective status reported more symptoms of depression, even when their objective socio-
economic status was taken into account. When neuroticism was taken into account, 
however, individuals with lower status did not report more symptoms of depression. 
Further analyses indicated that negative affect was not a sufficient proxy for neuroticism 
in the relation between subjective status and depression. In other words, when negative 
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affect was taken into account, subjective status continued to play a statistically significant 
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Introduction 
Status is often very important in social interactions. Hierarchical relations are 
amongst one of the basic forms of relating to others and these hierarchical relations begin 
as early as in childhood (Bugental, 2000; Fiske 1992). Status plays an important role in 
how individuals are perceived by others and is related to many forms of power. For 
example, individuals with higher status are usually perceived as more competent and 
assertive, and are more admired than individuals with lower status (Berger, Wagner, & 
Zelditch, 1985; Conway & Vartanian, 2000; Raven & Kruglanski, 1970). When people 
interact in groups, status hierarchies naturally develop (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 
1980). People are often very accurate at identifying their own status within a group and 
rarely overestimate their social position (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & 
Chatman, 2006). In other words, people know fairly well where they stand compared to 
others in terms of their social status in face to face groups.  
Individuals seem to situate themselves in a unidimensional status hierarchy. 
Despite the fact that there are many objective socio-economic status indicators (such as 
education, occupation, and income; Cralley, 2007), people generally assess their status in 
a global manner. In the study by Kluegel, Singelton, and Starnes (1977), participants 
indicated their level of education, their occupation, and their income. Participants also 
rated the social status of their education, occupation, and income separately (in terms of 
lower, working, middle, or upper class) and indicated their overall social class. 
Participants rated their education, occupation, and income in a way that reflected their 
perception of their overall social class, rather than their respective objective levels of 
education, occupation, and income. In other words, a unidimensional model of social 
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class was a better fit to participants' ratings than a multidimensional model which 
included separate dimensions. In sum, people do not perceive their education, occupation, 
and income separately in terms of status, but instead perceive themselves as having an 
overall social status.  
Measuring Subjective Status 
Although it has long been established that higher objective socio-economic status 
(SES henceforth) is associated with lower rates of morbidity and mortality, more recent 
research has examined how subjective status is related to health (e.g., Adler et al., 2008). 
Subjective status refers to how individuals perceive themselves in regards to others in 
society, in terms of social status. Although people will rely on their level of education, 
occupation, and income to assign themselves a certain subjective status, there is no strong 
positive correlation between people’s objective socio-economic status indices (i.e., 
education, occupation, and income) and their subjective status (Franzini & Fernandez-
Esquer, 2006; Karvonen & Rahkonen, 2011; Operario, Adler, & Williams, 2004). 
Researchers have focused on subjective status because it has been frequently argued that 
subjective status has a wide range of consequences for psychological adjustment and for 
health, above and beyond the objective measures of SES. 
A commonly used measure for subjective status, which was proposed by Adler, 
Epel, Castellazzo, and Ickovics (2000), is the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social 
Status. This scale is a 10 rung ladder, and participants are told that the people at the 
bottom of the ladder have the least education, worst occupation, and least income, 
whereas the people at the top of the ladder have the best or highest education, occupation, 
and income (Adler et al., 2000). Participants are then asked to place themselves on this 
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social ladder. In most studies conducted to date, researchers have either used the 
MacArthur scale or a modified version of the MacArthur scale in examining participants’ 
subjective status. Such studies will be reviewed in this paper.  
Relation of Subjective Status to Objective Socio-Economic Status 
Individuals’ scores on the subjective status scale are not simply a combination of 
their standing on objective SES factors (i.e., education, occupation, and income). Most of 
the correlations between subjective status and SES factors in the literature are low to 
moderate (here and below, the magnitude of correlations is described according to the 
guidelines proposed by Cohen [1988]). For example, Alfonsi, Conway, and Pushkar 
(2011) found that the correlations between objective SES measures and subjective status 
ranged from low (r = .17) for occupational prestige to moderate (r = .39) for salary. Adler 
and colleagues (2000) found individual correlations between objective SES measures and 
subjective status to vary from being quite low (r = .11 for occupation) to moderate 
associations (r = .32 for education). In the same study, a composite of individual scores 
of the three SES factors (i.e., household income, education, and occupation) correlated 
moderately with subjective status (r = .40). Other research has found correlations 
between individual SES measures and subjective status to range from small to moderate, 
but the correlations never exceeded .50 (Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer, 2006; Karvonen 
& Rahkonen, 2010; Operario et al., 2004; Sakurai, Kawakami, Yamaoka, Ishikawa, & 
Hashimoto, 2010; Wolff, Subramanian, Acevedo-Garcia, Weber, Kawachi, 2010). In 
light of these findings, it is reasonable to state that when individuals determine their 
status, they take into account more than just their objective SES.  
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Furthermore, when researchers have attempted to account for the variance in 
subjective status, they found that most of the variance was not accounted for by objective 
SES factors. In fact, researchers rarely reported the variance accounted for by only 
objective SES predictors. For example, Brown and colleagues (2008) found that objective 
SES measures (i.e., education and personal income) as well as a subjective measure of 
economic establishment (i.e., feeling financially secure) accounted for 6% of the variance 
in subjective status. Singh-Manoux, Adler, and Marmot (2003) found that SES factors 
(i.e., education, employment grade, and household income), along with satisfaction with 
standard of living, and feelings of financial security, all accounted for 48% of the 
variance in subjective status. Satisfaction with standard of living and feelings of financial 
security assessed in these studies may reflect other factors in addition to objective SES. 
As such, it is difficult to determine precisely what factors individuals take into account 
apart from their own objective SES when they assign themselves to a certain rank. 
Subjective Status and Health 
In a large amount of cross-sectional research, it has been found that people with 
lower subjective status have poorer health outcomes, even when objective SES factors 
are taken into account. Some of these poor health outcomes have been assessed in terms 
of self-ratings, such as poor self-rated health, stress, and depression. Other health 
outcomes have been objectively assessed, such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and 
mortality. The associations between subjective status and poor health were found in 
studies using both the MacArthur scale and modified versions of the MacArthur scale. 
Many different variations of the MacArthur scale have been utilized by 
researchers. With the MacArthur scale, participants rate themselves in relation to people 
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in society at large, in terms of education, occupation, and income, on a 10 rung ladder. 
Variations of the MacArthur scale have included changes to the comparison group, the 
subject (i.e., whose status is being rated), what status refers to (i.e., education, occupation, 
income, or other criteria), and the scaling of the measure (i.e., number of rungs in the 
scale or number of categories). The first change concerns the comparison group. Instead 
of asking participants to indicate their subjective status relative to society at large, some 
researchers have asked participants to indicate their subjective status relative to specific 
groups (e.g., their community, their school, and their ethnic group). In some cases, 
researchers seemed to have kept the focus on society at large, but modified the wording 
of the comparison group. For instance, researchers have asked their American 
participants to indicate their subjective status relative to the U.S. population or the 
American society. It is unclear whether an American participant would rate his or her 
status differently relative to the U.S. population or to society at large. The second change 
concerns whose status is being rated. Some researchers have asked participants to 
indicate the subjective status of a group they belong to (e.g., their family or their 
professional group) instead of their own personal subjective status. The third change 
concerns what status refers to. Some researchers have either omitted or modified the 
instructions of the scale, such that participants were not asked to indicate their subjective 
status in terms of education, occupation, and income. It is unclear whether participants 
would still take these SES factors into consideration when assessing their own status. The 
fourth change is in regard to the scaling of the measure. Some researchers have not used 
the standard 10 rung ladder in their research. Instead, they have either used a different 
number of rungs or used a scale with worded categories (e.g., upper to lower strata) rather 
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than a scale with rungs. There may be two potential issues when using a strata scale 
instead of a ladder scale. First, a strata scale has worded categories, whereas a ladder 
scale does not. As such, there may be more room for subjective interpretation when 
participants complete a ladder scale relative to a strata scale. The second issue is the 
number of categories. A ladder scale with 10 rungs offers more variability than a strata 
scale with only 5 categories. Nevertheless, regardless of how subjective status was 
assessed, individuals with lower subjective status seemed to have poorer health outcomes. 
Research that supports this claim will be examined in the following sections of this paper. 
The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Status and Health 
Researchers who have used the MacArthur scale in their studies have found that 
young and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status report poorer psychosocial 
health. Most of the cross-sectional studies reviewed below found statistically significant 
associations between subjective status and psychosocial health. For example, Adler and 
colleagues (2000) found that white adult women with lower subjective status reported 
more chronic stress, more pessimism, more passive coping and less active coping, and 
perceived having less control over their lives. These findings emerged even after 
controlling for negative affect and objective SES measures, namely education, occupation, 
and income. Similarly, Dennis and colleagues (2012) found that pregnant women with 
low subjective status were more likely to be depressed and to report high stress, than 
pregnant women who had high subjective status. In their study, the authors ran analyses 
comparing the women with low subjective status to those with high subjective status in 
their risk of depression and high stress. They controlled for two objective SES factors 
(i.e., education and income) and economic disadvantage (i.e., receiving public assistance, 
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having a basic utility shut off, and experiencing homelessness). In another study of 
pregnant women who quit smoking during their pregnancy, Reitzel and colleagues (2007) 
found that women with lower subjective status reported more negative affect, less 
positive affect, and less social support, after controlling for objective SES factors (i.e., 
education and income), ethnicity, and relationship status (i.e., having a partner). It is 
important to note that the authors found no statistically significant association between 
subjective status and depression, and between subjective status and stress. In another 
study of adults trying to quit smoking, Reitzel and colleagues (2010) found that 
participants with lower subjective status reported more symptoms of depression, more 
stress, less positive affect, and more negative affect. In addition, they were more likely to 
start smoking again after a period of abstinence. In that study, the authors controlled for 
objective SES factors (i.e., education, employment status, and income) and demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, and relationship status). In another study, male 
prisoners in Norway with low subjective status were more likely to report psychological 
distress relative to those with high subjective status (Friestad, 2010). However, they were 
not more likely to use drugs. The author ran analyses comparing prisoners with low 
subjective status to those with high subjective status and controlled for objective SES 
prior to imprisonment (i.e., education, occupation, income, and childhood SES), and age. 
Similarly, in two studies, middle-aged office workers had a higher risk of depression and 
reported more psychological distress with lower subjective status (with the exception of 
men who were not more likely to be depressed with lower subjective status; Singh-
Manoux et al., 2003; Singh-Manoux, Marmot, & Adler, 2005). In the first study, the 
authors examined the risk of depression in individuals with low subjective status relative 
SUBJECTIVE STATUS, DEPRESSION, AND NEUROTICISM  8 
 
to those with high subjective status and they controlled for life satisfaction, objective SES 
(i.e., education, employment grade, and income) and age (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). In 
the second study, the authors examined whether participants reported more psychological 
distress with lower subjective status (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005). The authors controlled 
only for employment grade and age. In another study, Kraus, Adler and Chen (2013) 
found that adults in the U.S. with lower subjective status reported more chronic negative 
affect and more symptoms of depression. The authors controlled for acute negative affect, 
objective SES factors (i.e., education and income), and demographic variables (i.e., age, 
gender, and ethnicity). As noted above, there were some null findings, whereby 
subjective status had no statistically significant association with psychosocial health 
outcomes. Furthermore, in one study focusing on the relation between subjective status 
and sleep disturbance, subjective status was unrelated to sleep disturbance in a sample of 
college students in the U.S. (Goodin, McGuire, & Smith, 2010). The authors controlled 
for psychosocial factors (i.e., depressive symptoms and stress), employment status, body 
mass index, and demographic variables (i.e., gender and ethnicity). In sum, in most 
studies in which the MacArthur scale has been used, researchers have found that young 
and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status report worse psychosocial health. 
In addition to young and middle-aged adults, researchers using the MacArthur 
scale found that older adults with lower subjective status report poorer psychosocial 
health. For example, Demakakos, Nazroo, Breeze, and Marmot (2008) found that older 
adults from England with lower subjective status were more likely to be depressed, even 
after controlling for objective SES measures (i.e., education, occupational class, wealth), 
age, and marital status. In summary, regardless of the age of participants, individuals with 
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lower subjective status report poorer psychosocial health in studies in which the 
MacArthur scale has been used. 
In addition to demonstrating this association between subjective status and 
psychosocial health, other research has focused on self-rated global health. Self-rated 
global health refers to the overall perception of one's health. Many studies have found 
that young and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status on the MacArthur scale 
report poorer self-rated global health. For example, Dennis and colleagues (2012) found 
that pregnant women in the U.S with low subjective status were more likely to report 
poor physical and emotional self-rated health during pregnancy and after giving birth 
compared to participants with high subjective status. The authors controlled for objective 
SES factors (i.e., education and income) and economic disadvantage (i.e., receiving 
public financial assistance, having a basic utility shut off, and experiencing 
homelessness). In another study, office workers in England with low subjective status 
were more likely to report poor global health compared to individuals with high 
subjective status, after controlling for life satisfaction, objective SES factors (i.e., 
education, employment grade, and personal income), and age (Singh-Manoux et al., 
2003). Similarly, in a longitudinal study with office workers in England, participants with 
lower subjective status reported poorer global health (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005). In that 
study, the authors controlled for employment grade and age. In another study with a 
national sample of Hungarian individuals, Kopp, Skrabski, Rethelyi, Kawachi, and Adler 
(2004) found that individuals with lower subjective status reported poorer global health. 
Unfortunately, that study had no control variables. Lundberg and Kristenson (2008) 
found that middle-aged individuals from Sweden with lower subjective status reported 
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poorer global health. In their study, the authors did not control for objective SES factors. 
Instead, they ran analyses controlling for demographic variable (i.e., age and gender) and 
different psychosocial factors individually (e.g., depression, life satisfaction, perceived 
control, and self-esteem). These different psychosocial control factors reduced somewhat 
the association between subjective status and self-rated global health, but it remained 
statistically significant. In another study of adults in the U.S., Kraus and colleagues (2013) 
found that participants with lower subjective status reported poorer global health. In 
addition, participants with lower subjective status reported poorer physical and emotional 
health. The authors controlled for acute negative affect, objective SES factors (i.e., 
education and income), and demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, and ethnicity). In 
two studies no statistically significant association was found between self-rated global 
health and subjective status among white adult women in the U.S. and male prisoners in 
Norway (Adler et al., 2000; Friestad, 2010). Nevertheless, in most studies in which the 
MacArthur scale was used, researchers have found that young and middle-aged adults 
with lower subjective status report poorer global health.  
In addition to young and middle-aged adults, older individuals with lower 
subjective status on the MacArthur scale also report poorer global health. Demakakos and 
colleagues (2008) found that older individuals with lower subjective status were more 
likely to report poor global health. The authors controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., 
education, occupational class, and wealth), age, and marital status. In other research, 
elderly individuals from Taiwan with lower subjective status reported poorer global 
health and more difficulties with daily instrumental activities (such as using a telephone 
or shopping) and with general physical activity, but their subjective status was unrelated 
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to their rudimentary daily activities (such as bathing and dressing; Hu, Adler, Goldman, 
Weinstein, & Seeman, 2005). The authors controlled for health-related factors (i.e., 
smoking and alcohol use), depressive symptoms, objective SES factors (i.e., education, 
working status, income, and socioeconomic index), and other demographic factors (i.e., 
age, sex, ethnicity, and marital status). In sum, regardless of age, individuals with lower 
subjective status on the MacArthur scale have reported poorer global health. 
In addition to poorer self-rated global health and psychosocial health, researchers 
have found that individuals with lower subjective status on the MacArthur scale have a 
higher rate of mortality. Kopp and colleagues (2004) found that individuals with lower 
subjective status had a higher rate of mortality in a national sample of elderly Hungarian 
individuals, even after controlling for self-rated global health. In summary, most 
researchers who have used the MacArthur scale in their studies have found that 
individuals with lower subjective status also have poorer psychosocial, self-rated, and 
objective health (namely a higher rate of mortality). Similar findings were observed in 
studies with modified versions of the MacArthur scale.   
Modified Versions of the MacArthur Subjective Status Scale and Health 
Studies with modified versions of the MacArthur scale have also shown that 
young and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status report worse psychosocial 
health. These findings were observed in samples with individuals living in the U.S. and in 
samples with individuals living outside the U.S. For example, in a community sample of 
adults living in the U.S., participants were asked to indicate where they stand relative to 
the U.S. population (Adler et al., 2008). Participants with low subjective status had a 
higher rate of depression than participants with high subjective status. The authors 
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controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., education, occupation, and income) and age. 
Similarly, pregnant women in the U.S., who indicated where they stood relative to the 
U.S. population, reported more symptoms of depression with lower subjective status 
(Stewart, Dean, Gregorich, Brawarsky, & Haas, 2007). The authors controlled for 
objective SES (i.e., personal income and the education level of women's mothers), 
economic disadvantage (i.e., public assistance and material deprivation), and 
demographic factors (i.e., age, ethnicity, and number of children). In another study, 
African American adults in the U.S were asked to indicate where they stand relative to 
the U.S. population and to their community (Subramanyam et al., 2012). Participants 
with lower subjective status on either one of the two measures had more symptoms of 
depression. However, they did not report more stress (with the odd exception of women 
who reported more stress with higher community subjective status). The authors 
controlled for a psychosocial factor (i.e., perceived lifetime discrimination), objective 
SES factors (i.e., education and income), and age. In another study, foreign-born Asian 
Americans were asked to indicate where they stand relative to their community and to the 
American population (Leu et al., 2008). Participants with lower subjective status on 
either measure reported more mood dysfunction. The authors controlled for objective 
SES factors (i.e., education and income), demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, 
ethnicity, and marital status), immigration factors (i.e., citizenship status and age at 
immigration), and English proficiency. In another study with Asian Americans, 
participants were asked to indicate where they stand relative to their community and to 
the U.S. population (Gong, Xu, & Takeuchi, 2012). Participants with lower subjective 
status on either one of the two measures reported more psychological distress. The 
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authors controlled for individual differences in social desirability, objective SES factors 
(i.e., education, occupation, and household income), demographic variables (i.e., age, 
gender, ethnicity, and marital status), the number of years living in the U.S., and English 
proficiency. Similarly, Ghaed and Gallo (2007) found that middle-aged women in the 
U.S., who indicated where they stood relative to their community, reported more 
depressive symptoms, trait anxiety, stress, pessimism, and less social support with lower 
subjective status. Participant subjective status relative to the U.S. population did not have 
any statistically significant association with these psychosocial outcomes. The authors 
controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., education, occupation, and household income), 
age, and ethnicity. In addition, in an experimental study with female college students, 
individuals who were induced to imagine having low subjective status reported more 
negative affect and ruminated more than individuals who were induced to imagine having 
high status (Jackson, Twenge, Souza, Chiang, & Goodman, 2011). The authors controlled 
for ethnicity. In sum, studies with modified versions of the MacArthur scale have shown 
that young and middle-aged individuals living in the U.S. with lower subjective status 
report poorer psychosocial health. Similar findings were observed for young and middle-
aged individuals living outside the U.S. 
Studies with modified versions of the MacArthur scale have shown that young 
and middle-aged adults living outside the U.S. with lower subjective status report worse 
psychosocial health. For example, individuals in South Africa were asked to indicate 
where they stand relative to their community and to their country (Hamad, Fernald, 
Karlan, & Zinman, 2008). Participants who reported lower subjective status relative to 
their community also reported more symptoms of depression and more stress. The 
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authors controlled for demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, province of 
residence, and number of people living in the household). Participant subjective status 
relative to their country was not significantly associated with depression and stress when 
the authors controlled for the demographic variables. In a study of long-term care staff 
members in Israel, participants were asked to indicate where they stand relative to their 
community (Ayalon, 2008). Participants with lower subjective status reported more 
emotional exhaustion, a lower sense of accomplishment and less positive aspects of 
caregiving, and were more likely to depersonalize their patients. The author controlled for 
work conditions (i.e., staff-to-patient ratio and daily hours of work), objective SES 
factors (i.e., education and professional affiliation), and the number of years worked with 
older adults. Sakurai and colleagues (2010), who compared individuals with high and low 
subjective status, found that women with low subjective status were more likely to report 
psychological distress. Men with low subjective status were not more likely to report 
psychological distress than men with high subjective status. The authors used a five-strata 
measure of subjective status instead of the 10 rung ladder in their study of a Japanese 
community sample, and they controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., education and 
household income), age, and marital status. In other research with prison guards in Italy, 
Sani, Magrin, Scrignaro, and Mccollum (2010) found that individuals who perceived 
their professional group (i.e., prison guards) lower on the subjective status ladder relative 
to other professional groups reported more stress, less job satisfaction, and higher 
psychiatric disturbance. The authors controlled for in-group (i.e., prison guards) 
identification, but not for SES factors. In their second study, a sample of individuals in 
Scotland who indicated where their family stood relative to their community on a 10 rung 
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ladder, reported more depressive symptoms, lower life satisfaction, and more stress with 
lower subjective status. The authors controlled only for in-group (i.e., family) 
identification. In addition to the few null findings mentioned previously, in one study, the 
authors did not find statistically significant associations between subjective status and 
two psychosocial measures in their sample of Asian Americans in the U.S. (i.e., 
depression and anxiety; John, de Castro, Martin, Duran, & Takeuchi, 2012). In that study, 
the authors asked participants to indicate where they stand relative to the U.S. population, 
their community, and their country of origin. The authors controlled for psychosocial 
factors (i.e., discrimination and social support), objective SES factors (i.e., education and 
occupational class), demographic factors (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and 
country of birth), immigration factors (i.e., immigration stress and years living in the 
U.S.), English proficiency, and health insurance. Nevertheless, most studies with 
modified versions of the MacArthur scale have shown that young and middle-aged 
individuals living outside the U.S. with lower subjective status report poorer psychosocial 
health.  
In addition to young and middle-aged adults, adolescents with lower subjective 
status on a modified version of the MacArthur scale report poorer psychosocial health. 
For example, 15 year old students in Finland with low subjective status were more likely 
to report psychological distress than students with high subjective status (Karvonen & 
Rahkonen, 2010). The subjective status measure in this study instructed participants to 
indicate where their family stands relative to society, instead of themselves. The authors 
controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., pocket money, parental education level, and 
parental employment status) and school performance. In contrast, Finkelstein, Kubzansky, 
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and Goodman (2006), found that high school students in the U.S. who indicated where 
their family stood relative to society were not more likely to smoke cigarettes with lower 
subjective status. However, when asked to indicate where they stand relative to other 
students in their school (in terms of respect, highest grades, and highest standing), 
students with lower subjective status were more likely to smoke. In this study, the authors 
controlled for stress, school grade level, parental education level, and demographic 
factors (i.e., age, gender, and ethnicity). In another study, high school students in the U.S. 
who indicated where their families stood relative to society reported less optimism and 
lower self-esteem, and perceived having less control over life with lower subjective status 
(Chen & Paterson, 2006). However, there were no control variables. In sum, regardless of 
age, individuals with lower subjective status on a modified version of the MacArthur 
scale report poorer psychosocial health. These findings are similar to the findings in 
studies in which the MacArthur scale was used.  
In addition to demonstrating the association between subjective status and 
psychosocial health in studies with modified versions of the MacArthur scale, other 
research with modified versions of the MacArthur scale has focused on self-rated global 
health. Young and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status on a modified version 
of the MacArthur scale report poorer global health. For example, in a national sample of 
U.S. adults, Operario and colleagues (2004) found that individuals who indicated where 
they stood relative to the U.S. population reported poorer global health with lower 
subjective status. The authors controlled for negative affect, health risks (i.e., high blood 
pressure and heart attack or heart problems), objective SES factors (i.e., education and 
income), and demographic factors (i.e., age, sex, and ethnicity). Franzini and Fernandez-
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Esquer (2006) found similar results in a national sample of Mexican Americans who 
indicated where they stood relative to "other people". Participants with lower subjective 
status were more likely to report poor global health. Although subjective status was not 
the largest predictor of self-rated global health, it still remained a statistically significant 
predictor after controlling for psychosocial factors (i.e., opportunity, perceived racism, 
perceived social support, perceived victimization, personal trust, and religiosity), 
objective SES factors (i.e., education, work status, and income), and demographic factors 
(i.e., age, gender, and country of birth). In the same study, participants also rated their 
physical and emotional health separately. Subjective status was not a statistically 
significant predictor of either physical or emotional self-rated health. In another study 
with a large nationally representative U.S. sample, participants indicated where they 
stood relative to four different referent groups: relative to the American population, to 
their ethnic group, to their neighbors, and to their parents when they were the same age 
(Wolff et al., 2010). Only subjective status relative to the American population had a 
statistically significant association with global health; individuals with low subjective 
status were more likely to report poor global health compared to individuals who had 
medium subjective status. There was no statistically significant differences between 
individuals with high subjective status and medium subjective status in their likelihood of 
reporting poor global health. The authors controlled for psychosocial factors (i.e., 
presence of anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression in the past year), physical 
health factors (i.e., body mass index, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, skin 
cancer, and other cancer), objective SES factors (i.e., education, household income, and 
home ownership), demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and 
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household size), and health insurance. Adler and colleagues (2008) found similar results 
in their community sample of adults living in the U.S. who were asked to indicate where 
they stand relative to the U.S. population. Participants with low subjective status were 
more likely to report poor global health than participants with high subjective status. The 
authors controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., education, occupation, and income) and 
age. Similarly, Castro, Gee, and Takeuchi (2010) used two measures of subjective status 
in their study of Asian Americans living in the U.S. Participants indicated where they 
stood relative to their community and to the U.S. population. The authors did not report 
results for each subjective status separately. They created an average for each participant 
by combining participants' answers on both scales. Participants with lower subjective 
status were more likely to report poor physical health. The authors controlled for 
financial strain, satisfaction with economic opportunity, objective SES factors (i.e., 
education, occupation, and income), demographic variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, country of birth, region of residence), and the number of years living in the 
U.S. In another study with Asian Americans, participants indicated where they stood 
relative to their community and to the U.S. population (Gong et al., 2012). Participants 
with lower subjective status on either one of the two measures were more likely to report 
poor physical and emotional health. The authors controlled for social desirability, 
objective SES factors (i.e., education, occupation, and household income), demographic 
variables (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, and marital status), the number of years living in the 
U.S., and English proficiency. Similarly, in a sample of pregnant women in the U.S., 
participants indicated where they stood relative to the U.S. population (Stewart et al., 
2007). Participants with lower subjective status reported poorer global health. The 
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authors controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., personal income and the education level 
of women's mothers), economic disadvantage (i.e., public financial assistance and 
material deprivation), and demographic factors (i.e., age, ethnicity, and number of 
children). In another study of pregnant women in the U.S., participants indicated where 
they stood relative to the U.S. population (Ostrove, Adler, Kuppermann, & Washington, 
2000). Chinese and Caucasian women with lower subjective status reported poorer global 
health. However, Latin and African American women did not report poorer global health 
with lower subjective status. The authors controlled for education and household income. 
In sum, young and middle-aged adults with lower subjective status on a modified version 
of the MacArthur scale report poorer global health. In addition to the null findings 
mentioned above, in one study subjective status was not significantly associated with 
self-rated physical and mental health (John et al., 2012). In that study with Asian 
Americans, participants were asked to indicate their status relative to the U.S. population, 
their community, and their country of origin. None of these measures predicted self-rated 
physical and mental health when all control variables were accounted for. The authors 
controlled for psychosocial factors (i.e., perceived discrimination and perceived social 
support), objective SES factors (i.e., education and occupational class), demographic 
factors (i.e., age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and country of birth), immigration 
factors (i.e., immigration stress and years living in the U.S.), English proficiency, and 
health insurance. 
In addition to young and middle-aged adults, adolescents with lower subjective 
status on a modified version of the MacArthur scale also report poorer global health. For 
example, 15 year-old students in Finland with low subjective status were more likely to 
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report average or poor global health and more health complaints than students with high 
subjective status (Karvonen & Rahkonen, 2010). Participants were asked to indicate 
where their family stands relative to society, instead of themselves. The authors 
controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., pocket money, parental education level, and 
parental employment status) and school performance. Similarly, Goodman, Huang, 
Schafer-Kalkhoff, and Adler (2007) asked high school students in the U.S. to indicate 
where they stand relative to the U.S. population. Participants with lower subjective status 
reported poorer global health. The authors controlled for objective SES factors (i.e., 
parental education level and household income) and demographic factors (i.e., age, 
gender, and ethnicity). These associations between subjective status and self-rated global 
health remained three years later, when global health was reassessed. In sum, regardless 
of age, individuals with lower subjective status on a modified version of the MacArthur 
scale report poorer global health. 
In summary, most cross-sectional studies that looked at the relation between 
subjective status and health found that individuals with lower subjective status report 
poorer psychosocial and global health. These associations between subjective status and 
health were found regardless of the measure of subjective status used. In addition, the 
associations between subjective status and health were evident across the populations 
studied to date, regardless of age; subjective status was associated with health outcomes 
in teenagers, young adults, middle-aged adults, and elderly individuals. One experimental 
study supports the view that subjective status has a causal impact on negative affect. 
Finally, across the studies that looked at the relation between subjective status and a 
psychosocial outcome measure, many studies examined the relation between subjective 
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status and depression or a related construct (such as negative affect or mood dysfunction). 
Although the measures of depression and related constructs varied, these studies 
nevertheless found that individuals with low subjective status have a higher risk of 
depression or negative affect relative to individuals with high subjective status.  
Depression 
Depression is a pervasive state characterized by apathy, loss of interest, anhedonia 
(i.e., inability to find pleasure in enjoyable activities), and negative affect (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Often, it is also accompanied by feelings of low self-
esteem and social withdrawal. Among mental disorders, major depression is the leading 
cause of disability in the workplace around the world (Gotlib & Hammen, 2009). 
Lifetime prevalence ranges between 5% and 12% for men and 10% and 25% for women 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In addition, at any point in time, between 2% 
and 3% of men and 5% and 9% of women suffer from major depression (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
Cognitive Theories of Depression 
There are different cognitive theories of depression. Two prominent theories are 
Beck's cognitive theory and the hopelessness theory. Beck's (1967) cognitive theory of 
depression suggests that depression occurs as a result of a negative interpretation of 
events. Individuals who are more prone to depression tend to perceive events as more 
negative and, as a result, to experience more negative emotions. This negative perception 
of events is theorized to be due to different filters, or schemas, that people use to process 
information. Schemas serve to process and filter all the information that is received and 
to direct attention to the most relevant aspects. Schemas can be conceptualized as a belief 
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system and they tend to center around specific themes.  Individuals assign meanings to 
situations through these schemas. In the case of depression, these schemas may center on 
negative themes, such as unlovability or inadequacy, and events are interpreted through 
these schemas. Beck theorized that automatic thoughts are generated through these 
schemas in interpreting events, such as ‘’he doesn’t love me” when a partner can’t make 
it to a date. Specifically, depressed individuals may have more negative automatic 
thoughts in ambiguous or stressful situations, more so than non-depressed individuals 
(Crawford & Cromwell, 1995; Dohr, Rush, & Bernstein, 1989; Hollon & Kendall, 1980; 
Hollon, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; Kwon & Oei, 1992). As a result, individuals who are 
more prone to depression may have more negative thoughts about themselves, about the 
world, and about the future. 
 Another theory of depression, proposed by Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) 
is the hopelessness theory of depression. This theory suggests that hopeless depression 
may develop depending on the inferences people draw regarding causes, consequences, 
and the nature of the self following a negative event. If individuals attribute negative 
events to stable (i.e., lasting a long time) and global (i.e., affecting many areas of life) 
causes, then hopeless depression may be more likely to develop. In addition, in this 
theory, the perceived consequences also play a role in mediating the relation between 
negative events and hopeless depression. If an event is perceived as having consequences 
that are important, unchangeable, and affecting many different areas of life, then hopeless 
depression may develop. For example, if an individual who failed an exam perceives this 
as the end of his academic career, he may be more likely to get depressed. Moreover, 
individuals may be more likely to be depressed if they infer negative characteristics about 
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themselves following a negative event. For example, in a situation in which a student 
fails an exam, if he assumes that he is not smart enough for school or perceives himself as 
worthless, he may become depressed. In sum, in this theory, this attributional style, 
whereby individuals attribute the causes of negative events to global and stable factors 
and make negative inferences about the self, may increase feelings of hopelessness when 
negative events occur.   
 Hopelessness theory (Abramson et al., 1989) and the cognitive theory proposed 
by Beck (1967) overlap to a certain degree. Both theories suggest that individuals who 
are more prone to depression have a tendency to interpret events in a more negative 
manner. These individuals are more likely to perceive the causes of the events as more 
global, rather than situational. In addition, they may be more likely to make negative 
inferences about themselves and about their future. Both theories suggest a diathesis 
stress model for depression, whereby cognitive factors predispose individuals to 
depression in the face of negative life events. Diathesis stress models of depression 
suggest that the diathesis (i.e., predisposition) increases the rate of depression given 
major stressful events. In contrast to these cognitive diathesis stress models of depression, 
Monroe and Simons (1991) suggested that some individuals are more predisposed to 
experience depression following a major stressful event, but that predisposition also 
increases their chances of experiencing those major stressful events (e.g., divorce, loss of 
employment, loss of a loved one, or severe health problems; Monreo & Hadjiyannakis, 
2002). In other words, the diathesis not only increases the risk of depression itself 
following a major stressful event, but also the occurrence of such events. For example, an 
individual who is predisposed to be depressed from social rejection may act in ways that 
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would eventually lead to rejection, by needing more reassurance from close peers and a 
significant other. One candidate for this predisposition for depression is neuroticism. 
Neuroticism is linked to many anxiety and mood disorders, and affects a wide range of 
life outcomes, namely the predisposition to experience major negative life events (such as 
divorce, loss of employment, and severe health problems). As such, neuroticism may be a 
very important factor when looking at depression.  
Neuroticism 
Neuroticism is a personality characteristic that refers to people’s propensity to 
experience negative emotions and it affects a wide range of domains and experiences. 
Neuroticism is very stable across the lifespan in terms of relative rank order; this means 
that individuals who score higher on neuroticism remain higher on the neuroticism scale 
than those who score lower (Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). It is also highly heritable, 
with 40-60% of the variability in neuroticism scores being due to genetic factors (Lahey, 
2009; Widiger, 2009). However, neuroticism, as a personality characteristic, is more 
related to genetic factors in younger individuals than in older individuals (Lahey, 2009). 
In other words, life experiences play a larger role in the level of neuroticism of older 
individuals than of younger individuals, because older individuals have had more life 
experiences. Individuals with high neuroticism tend to experience more negative 
emotions, such as anxiety, anger, and guilt, thereby showing more emotional instability 
(Widiger, 2009). Prominent behavioral aspects of neuroticism include hostility (e.g., 
mistrust of others, cynicism, resentment, and devaluation of others), aggression (i.e., 
harmful actions towards others), and impulsivity (Widiger, 2009). 
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Neuroticism has also been linked to poorer self-representation. Individuals with 
high neuroticism scores tend to be more self-critical (i.e., having negative evaluations of 
themselves; (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994). It is 
therefore not surprising that individuals with higher neuroticism also have lower self-
esteem (Judge et al., 1998; Watson, Suls, & Haig, 2002).  
Neuroticism and Depression 
Individuals with higher neuroticism scores tend to be more depressed (Malouff, 
Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2005). Furthermore, they are at higher risk for anxiety 
disorders. Individuals with high neuroticism are also at greater risk for other psychiatric 
disorders, namely schizophrenia, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders (i.e., 
medically unexplained physical symptoms; Khan, Jacobson, Gardner, Prescott, & 
Kendler, 2005; Malouff et al., 2005). They also have more eating disorders and substance 
abuse disorders (Khan et al., 2005; Malouff et al., 2005). In addition, neuroticism is 
linked to higher comorbidity among different mental disorders (Khan et al., 2005). 
Individuals who have both an anxiety and a mood disorder have significantly higher 
scores on neuroticism than individuals with only one of these disorders (Weinstock & 
Whisman, 2006). Nevertheless, individuals with either a mood or an anxiety disorder 
have higher neuroticism scores than individuals without any disorder.  
Although neuroticism and depression are often highly correlated, they are clearly 
different constructs. Whereas neuroticism is a stable personality trait across the lifespan, 
depression occurs in episodes, lasting for months or years, followed by remission. The 
majority of individuals who suffer from depressive episodes recover within the first year 
(Gotlib & Hammen, 2009). Only approximately 10 percent of individuals who suffer 
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from a depressive episode do not recover within the first 5 years of its onset. Both 
depression and neuroticism are characterized by a propensity for negative emotions, but 
the negative affect in depression is more intense and pervasive. In addition, depression is 
usually accompanied by behavioral and emotional deficits that are not present in 
neuroticism (such as anhedonia and changes in appetite and sleep). As such, depression 
and neuroticism are not the same constructs. Nevertheless, higher neuroticism may 
predispose individuals to experience depressive episodes. 
There are many pathways through which neuroticism may be linked to depression 
and other mental disorders. One of these pathways is a genetic predisposition. The same 
genetic factors involved in neuroticism may be involved in many mental disorders. This 
is perhaps why in twin studies, one third to two thirds of the genetic variance in many 
mental disorders is shared with neuroticism, in terms of the distribution of these disorders 
in the population (Hettema, Neale, Myers, Prescott, & Kendler, 2006). Research has 
identified some of the genetic predisposition for neuroticism and depression. The 
serotonergic system, which regulates the level of serotonin in the brain, has been 
implicated with neuroticism. In humans, the 5-HTTLPR gene has two different forms, a 
short and a long form. Given that individuals possess two alleles, they may inherit a 
combination of two short alleles of the 5-HTTLPR gene, two long alleles, or one long 
and one short allele. Different genetic studies have found that individuals having a short 
allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene are more likely to have higher neuroticism scores than 
individuals possessing two long alleles (Schinka, Busch, & Robichaux-Keene, 2004; Sen, 
Burmeister, & Ghosh, 2004). The presence of the short allele of this 5-HTTLPR gene is 
also associated with a higher risk for depression following stressful life events (Caspi et 
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al., 2003; Lotrich & Pollock, 2004). As such, neuroticism and depression may have 
similar genetic roots. Moreover, possessing a short 5-HTTLPR allele has also been 
implicated in higher alcohol consumption (Munafo, Lingford-Hughes, Johnstone, & 
Walton, 2005). It is therefore not surprising that individuals with higher neuroticism 
scores tend to have more alcohol use disorders (Khan et al., 2005; Malouff et al., 2005). 
 Another pathway through which neuroticism may impact the occurrence of 
depressive disorder may be through self-criticism. Individuals with higher neuroticism 
scores are more self-critical, in that they have more negative evaluations of themselves 
(Judge et al., 1998; Watson et al., 1994). It has previously been shown that greater self-
criticism is linked to a greater occurrence and severity of depression (Dunkley, Sanislow, 
Grilo, & McGlashan, 2009; Regev, Shahar, & Lipsitz, 2012; Tang, Zhou, Liao, & Zhu, 
2011).   
 Another pathway from neuroticism to depressive disorder may be through 
negative life events. Individuals with higher neuroticism scores experience more negative 
life events (Kandler, Bleidorn, Reimann, Angleitner, & Spinath, 2012; Magnus, Diener, 
Fujita, & Pavot, 1993), such as divorce, serious illness, and loss of employment, which 
may, in turn, bring them at a higher risk of developing a depressive disorder. These 
findings are in line with Monroe and Simons' (1991) diathesis stress model, which 
suggested that the diathesis may not only predispose individuals to experience depression 
following a major stressful event, but also to experience more of these negative events 
(Monreo & Hadjiyannakis, 2002; Monroe & Simons, 1991). Such a predisposition may 
include higher neuroticism. 
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In sum, neuroticism and depression may be connected through many different 
pathways. For one, neuroticism and depression have similar genetic predispositions. 
Second, individuals with higher neuroticism scores may be more likely to experience 
depression because of greater self-criticism. Third, these individuals also experience 
more negative life events, which precipitate depression.  
Social Rank and Evolutionary Theories of Depression 
 There are many evolutionary theories of depression that may partially account for 
the link between depression and social status, namely the Involuntary Defeat Strategy 
(IDS), Resource Allocation theory, and Incentive Disengagement theory. The IDS theory 
was proposed by Sloman, Gilbert, and Hasey (2003). It is a theory of depression based on 
social phenomena. The IDS is triggered in social situations in which the individual 
perceives being defeated. In order to minimize social and physical damage, this strategy 
promotes submission or flight, and reduces confrontation. Individuals experience feelings 
of defeat, inferiority, negative affect, and loss of self-esteem. Depending on the situation, 
these feelings enable them to either adopt subordinate behavior or to escape the situation, 
which will minimize further losses or prevent further damage and punishment. In order 
for the IDS to be turned off and depressive symptoms to disappear, the individual must 
escape the situation, accept his defeat, or get help dealing with the situation. For example, 
an individual who feels controlled by a significant other and who cannot either escape the 
relationship or end the control may be more likely to become depressed. In that case, the 
IDS may become chronic and may manifest itself as depression.  
The IDS may turn into depression when the person cannot concentrate their 
efforts in another pursuit. Depression may occur because of external events (such as the 
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person is still controlled by the significant other after the dissolution of the relationship) 
or internal events (e.g., the person ruminating on his past relationship). In such situations, 
the IDS may not turn off and may turn into depression. Another example is in the context 
of a loss of employment. The IDS may not turn off if an individual fails to find another 
job, or ruminates on the failure to sustain the previous employment. In some cases, the 
IDS may also be affected by changes in social rank or chronically low social rank. For 
example, an individual who finds a less lucrative or less prestigious employment after 
losing his job may be more likely to be depressed.  
The IDS theory of depression suggests that depression is a social phenomenon, 
triggered by social defeat, failure, or inability to achieve a desirable social standing. It 
posits that depression may occur if the individual fails to accept his or her defeat or 
escape a negative situation. In other words, accepting defeat or escaping unwanted 
situations provides individuals with an opportunity to concentrate their efforts on other 
pursuits or goals. The IDS theory of depression may partially account for the link 
between subjective status and depression. When individuals experience a loss of status, 
loss of employment, or are unable to achieve a desirable social position, they may 
perceive their status as low and be more susceptible to depression. If they remain in their 
low social position, either by not being able to achieve a more desirable position, or by 
not being able to change their perception of it, they may have higher rates of depression 
than individuals who do not perceive their status as low. This may explain why lower 
subjective status is associated with higher rates of depression.  
The IDS theory is similar to the Resource Allocation theory, proposed by Nesse 
(2000), which suggests that low moods and depression are evolutionarily adaptive. In the 
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Resource Allocation theory, depression permits individuals to disengage from pursuits 
that are dangerous or not profitable and to allocate their efforts and resources to 
endeavors that will yield benefits. For example, an individual applying to a managerial 
position who cannot find employment may benefit from disengaging from that goal and 
concentrating his efforts into getting hired for a lower position. These actions would 
increase his likelihood of finding employment. In addition, the Resource Allocation 
theory posits that depression prevents individuals from acting in situations when doing so 
would be more costly to them. Unlike the IDS theory, the Resource Allocation theory 
does not directly relate subjective status to depression.  
The IDS is also very similar to the Incentive Disengagement theory, proposed by 
Klinger (1975), which suggests that depression is part of a cycle that enables individuals 
to disengage from goals too difficult or impossible to achieve. When an individual is 
pursuing a goal and encounters obstacles to its achievement, he or she is first frustrated 
and tries harder to succeed. However, when such attempts fail, the person then becomes 
aggressive. Depression follows aggression and permits individuals to disengage from the 
goal. This is evident through feelings of apathy and loss of pleasure. Usually, depression 
is followed by recovery if other meaningful goals can be found and successes can be 
experienced by the person. The Incentive Disengagement theory is very similar to the 
Resource Allocation theory, in that they both state that depression is necessary in order to 
abandon unprofitable pursuits, thereby enabling individuals to concentrate their efforts on 
other pursuits. Nevertheless, the Incentive Disengagement theory does not directly relate 
subjective status to depression.   
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The IDS theory is very similar to both the Incentive Disengagement theory and 
the Resource Allocation theory. All three theories propose that depression permits 
individuals to disengage from failed pursuits or negative situations, and reduces the risk 
of more loss or harm. Both the IDS and Incentive Disengagement theory suggest that in 
order for individuals not to experience depression following defeat or failure, individuals 
must escape the situation and concentrate their efforts on other endeavors. If individuals 
fail to do so, by remaining in their negative situation, or ruminating on their failure, and 
not finding other pursuits to concentrate on, they will experience depression. In contrast 
to the Resource Allocation and Incentive Disengagement theories, the IDS theory 
proposes that an individual can accept defeat in order to avoid depression. Finally, 
although these theories are very similar at the core, the IDS states that social failure can 
create depression if it is not accepted or escaped, while the other two speak more 
generally of goals and endeavors. As such, the IDS theory of depression relates 
subjective status to depression, whereby a drop in subjective status may lead to 
depression.  
An alternative explanation for the link between subjective status and depression 
may be the influence of neuroticism on both subjective status and depression. Individuals 
with higher neuroticism may experience lower subjective status and higher rates of 
depression. That may be due to the fact that individuals with higher neuroticism are more 
likely to have lower objective SES, fewer accomplishments, less social support, and a 
wide range of other negative social outcomes. 
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Neuroticism and Subjective Status 
People who are higher on neuroticism may have lower subjective status. There 
may be a number of processes that make individuals with higher neuroticism situate 
themselves lower on the subjective status ladder. Some of these processes may be based 
on psychosocial factors (i.e., damaging social comparisons, exaggerated perception of 
failure, and lower status in groups), while the others are based on economic (i.e., lower 
objective SES) and health (i.e., poorer health) factors. Some of these factors may be more 
evident for older individuals as opposed to younger adults, such as differences in health 
and SES, because the effects of neuroticism may be cumulative throughout the lifetime. 
In other words, the effects of neuroticism on health and SES may become greater with 
time. The processes through which higher neuroticism may be linked to lower subjective 
status are examined in the following paragraphs. 
The first process through which higher neuroticism may be related to lower 
subjective status is through damaging social comparison. Individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores tend to engage in more damaging social comparison. In a study of 
cancer patients, VanderZee, Buunk, and Sanderman (1996) found that individuals with 
higher neuroticism scores expressed a greater need for social comparison, in that they 
expressed a greater need for affiliation to others similar to themselves and a greater need 
to seek information about others. In addition, when it came to assessing their own health 
in relation to the health of others, individuals with higher neuroticism scores were more 
likely to compare themselves to people who were better off relative to individuals with 
lower neuroticism scores. Finally, when individuals with higher neuroticism scores made 
social comparisons to individuals who were better or worse off they tended to have more 
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negative evaluations of their own health. They also tended to experience greater negative 
emotional responses in relation to these comparisons relative to individuals with lower 
neuroticism scores. The study was conducted with cancer patients with a mean age of 
58.4 years. Damaging social comparison may also be prominent in younger individuals 
with higher neuroticism scores.  
In addition to damaging social comparisons, higher neuroticism may be related to 
lower subjective status through negative self-evaluations. Gilbert and Allan (1994) found 
that neuroticism was positively related to negative evaluations of oneself compared to 
others on different dimensions, such as likeability, social standing, competence, group 
belonging, and level of openness. Individuals who had more negative evaluations of 
themselves when they compared themselves to others, were more likely to display 
submissive behavior, as assessed through self-reports. In sum, neuroticism may be related 
to subjective status through damaging social comparison and negative self-evaluations.  
The second process through which neuroticism may be related to subjective status 
is through the exaggerated perception of failure. Sturman and Mongrain (2008) found 
that compared to individuals with lower neuroticism scores, individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores who participated in sports competitions were more likely to feel a 
great sense of loss after losing a sports game. This great sense of loss was exaggerated in 
that it not only applied to the sport game, but was also generalized to their life. An 
example of a question meant to measure this sense of loss was "I feel that I have lost 
important battles in life" (Sturman & Mongrain, 2008). Individuals with lower 
neuroticism scores were not as likely to exaggerate their loss and extrapolate it to their 
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lives. As such, individuals with higher neuroticism scores may have lower subjective 
status because they have an exaggerated perception of their failures.  
In addition to having an exaggerated perception of failure, individuals with higher 
neuroticism may have lower subjective status because they feel less competent and 
successful in their lives. Sturman (2011) found a strong correlation between neuroticism 
and a higher order construct, which he named involuntary subordination, derived through 
exploratory factor analysis. In that study, involuntary subordination was a combination of 
statements referring to a sense of loss and lack of success in life (e.g., "I feel that I have 
not made it in life"; Sturman, 2011), the perception of the frequency of one's own 
submissive behaviors, and the degree to which one feels trapped in situations that one 
wants to escape (e.g., "I am in a situation I feel trapped in"; Sturman, 2011). The measure 
also included social comparison, which seemed to reflect the degree to which participants 
compared themselves to others in terms of attractiveness, social rank, and group 
belonging (i.e., how much they fit into a group). The higher order construct that Sturman 
(2011) labeled involuntary subordination predicted depressive symptoms. In sum, 
individuals with higher neuroticism scores tend to have an exaggerated perception of 
their failures, a factor which may lower their subjective status.    
The third process through which neuroticism may be related to subjective status is 
through lower status in groups. Individuals with higher neuroticism scores tend to have 
lower status in groups. Specifically, Anderson, John, Keltner, and Kring (2001) found 
that men with higher neuroticism scores had lower status in groups, as rated by their 
peers, but it was not the case for women. A potential explanation may be that men with 
higher neuroticism are more socially disadvantaged when displaying negative emotions 
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compared to women with higher neuroticism (Anderson et al., 2001). Whereas women 
displaying negative emotions may be comforted, men displaying such emotions may be 
seen as less masculine and may lose status in groups. Gender norms dictate that men 
cannot display fear, depression, or guilt. Those who display negative emotions are seen as 
less 'manly'. Although the expression of negative emotions may not be desirable in both 
genders, it does not have such a large impact on the status of women compared to men. In 
addition, negative emotions associated with higher neuroticism, such as fear, shame, and 
embarrassment, may impede on the attainment of higher status (Anderson et al., 2001). 
These emotions may prevent individuals from acting in an assertive manner. In fact, 
individuals with higher neuroticism scores behave more submissively than individuals 
with lower neuroticism scores, as is apparent in their self-reports regarding their own 
behaviors (Gilbert & Allan, 1994). They also tend to have more negative evaluations of 
themselves compared to others on different dimensions (Gilbert & Allan, 1994). Their 
increased submissive behavior and negative self-evaluations when comparing themselves 
to others, may, in turn, contribute in lowering their status in groups and may decrease 
their subjective status. In summary, individuals with higher neuroticism scores are more 
likely to make damaging social comparisons, evaluate themselves in a negative way, 
perceive their failures as having large consequences, and have lower status in groups 
(specifically men), factors which may lower their subjective status.  
The fourth process through which individuals with higher neuroticism scores may 
have lower subjective status is through lower objective SES. Individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores have lower occupational attainment and lower incomes (Judge, 
Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999; Roberts, Caspi, & Mofﬁtt, 2003). Although these 
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socio-economic disadvantages are more visible for older adults, they are nonetheless 
present for individuals in early and middle adulthood but to a lower degree. Individuals 
with higher neuroticism scores also experience lower job satisfaction (Judge, Heller, & 
Mount, 2002), which may ultimately have an impact on their occupational attainment and 
ability to maintain their job. In fact, individuals with higher neuroticism scores are more 
likely to experience job loss (Magnus et al., 1993). 
Neuroticism may also be related to performance at work through negative affect. 
In a meta-analysis on work performance and negative affect, Kaplan, Bradley, Luchman, 
and Haynes (2009) found that individuals who experienced more negative affect had a 
higher incidence of work-related injuries, counter-productive work behaviors, and 
withdrawal behaviors at work. These relations were especially strong when assessed 
through self-report measures and supervisor ratings compared to objective measures 
(such as number of sales). Given that negative affect is an important emotional 
component of neuroticism, it would be reasonable to assume that individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores would also exhibit these work-related behaviors and have work-
related injuries. In sum, individuals with higher neuroticism scores may have lower 
subjective status because of lower objective SES.  
The fifth process through which individuals with higher neuroticism scores may 
have lower subjective status is through poorer self-rated health. Individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores are more likely to report poor health, to have more somatic complaints, 
and to experience more catastrophic thoughts about their symptoms (Lahey, 2009; 
Löckenhoff, Terracciano, Ferrucci, & Costa, 2012; Okun & George, 1984; Vassend, 
Røysamb, & Nielsen, 2012). Poor perceived health in individuals with higher neuroticism 
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scores may reduce their subjective status, because individuals with poor perceived health 
may feel less effective, less desirable, and less able to perform. Given that most of the 
variance in subjective status is not explained through objective SES factors, it may be 
partially explained through perceived and actual health. Although most research on 
neuroticism and self-rated health was conducted with older individuals, it may be 
reasonable to assume that neuroticism may also affect how younger individuals perceive 
their health. In fact, Page and colleagues (2009) found that self-rated health in 
adolescents was related to many psychological factors. Although they did not measure 
neuroticism specifically, it seems likely that neuroticism may also affect young adults' 
perception of their health. However, the effects of neuroticism on self-rated health may 
be more prominent in older adults, because older individuals are more likely to have 
actual health problems than younger individuals.  
Poor self-rated health of individuals with higher neuroticism scores may reflect 
their poorer objective health. Individuals with higher neuroticism scores have a higher 
risk of atopic eczema, asthma, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and irritable bowel 
syndrome (Lahey, 2009). Individuals with higher neuroticism scores also have a higher 
rate of mortality in old age (Lahey, 2009; Wilson, Mendes de Leon, Bienias, Evans, & 
Bennett, 2004). In addition, when diagnosed with cardiovascular disease, individuals with 
higher neuroticism scores are less likely to survive (Shipley, Weiss, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 
2007). Declines in health occur more often in older adults and elderly individuals, so 
differences in objective health may also be more visible during that time frame.  
Given that individuals with higher neuroticism scores experience poorer objective 
and self-rated health, it may lead them to experience lower subjective status. In fact, in a 
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longitudinal study of older individuals, Alfonsi (2011) found that self-reported illness (as 
assessed through a self-report measure, which looked at the presence and severity of 69 
different physical illnesses) experienced by elderly individuals, was associated with their 
lower subjective status. When assessed at different times, individuals who experienced a 
decrease in objective health subsequently experienced a decrease in subjective status. 
Alfonsi (2011) also found that poorer objective health (which was measured by the 
number of medical interventions received in a year through the public health insurance of 
Quebec) was negatively associated with the change in subjective status in the following 
year, even after controlling for neuroticism. In other words, individuals who had more 
medical interventions had lower subjective status the following year.   
In sum, individuals with higher neuroticism scores may have lower subjective 
status because they tend to make more damaging social comparisons and to have more 
negative self-evaluations, to react more negatively to loss in social competition, and to 
have lower status in groups. In addition, they also have lower objective SES, in terms of 
income and occupational attainment. If subjective status is partially based on objective 
SES, individuals with higher neuroticism scores may have lower subjective status. 
Moreover, individuals with higher neuroticism scores have poorer self-rated and 
objective health, both factors which may lead these individuals to have lower subjective 
status. Lower SES and poorer health are factors that may be especially apparent for older 
individuals. As noted above, in addition to these factors, individuals with higher 
neuroticism scores are more self-critical, which may also contribute to a lower subjective 
status. 
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While subjective status has been found to predict depressive symptoms, most 
studies on subjective status and depressive symptoms did not include neuroticism as a 
potential mediator. The current study will address this issue and attempt to clarify the 
relation between subjective status, depression, and neuroticism.  
Neuroticism and Negative Affect 
 Individuals usually experience negative affect in response to a threatening or 
unpleasant situation (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). Negative affect may 
include emotions such as fear, guilt, irritation, shame, and distress. Watson and 
colleagues (1999) argued that negative affect is a core component of the behavioral 
system that regulates withdrawal behaviors in situations of threat. Daily affective 
experience can be characterized in terms of different levels of positive and negative affect. 
Although intense positive and negative affect rarely occur together, everyday experiences 
of positive and negative affect are not mutually exclusive (Diener & Iran-Nejad, 1986). 
In other words, individuals can experience low to moderate levels of both negative and 
positive affect simultaneously. In fact, positive and negative affect are not correlated; 
they are orthogonal (i.e., statistically independent; Watson et al., 1999). 
 In looking at the relation between subjective status and health, some authors used 
negative affect as a control variable (Adler et al., 2000; Kraus et al., 2013; Operario et al., 
2004). Participants reported on their acute negative affect at the same time as they 
completed measures of subjective status and health. The relation between negative affect 
and the other variables was controlled for when examining the relation between 
subjective status and health. The rationale behind using negative affect as a control 
variable is that it may influence the relation between subjective status and health, by 
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affecting people's ratings on both of these measures. This rationale is supported by the 
evidence that negative affect correlates with both subjective status and health, specifically 
self-rated health (Adler et al., 2000; Operario et al., 2004). Individuals who experience 
more negative affect have poorer perceptions of their subjective status and health. 
 In order to assess the relation among negative affect, subjective status, and self-
rated health, Kraus and colleagues (2013) examined whether self-reported chronic 
negative affect mediates the relation between subjective status and self-rated health. They 
found that individuals with lower subjective status had lower self-rated health, but that 
the relation was reduced when negative affect was considered, even though the relation 
between subjective status and self-rated health remained statistically significant. In 
addition, they argued that there was a statistically significant indirect effect of subjective 
status on self-rated health through negative affect. Based on their findings, the authors 
concluded that the effects of subjective status on self-rated health were largely 
independent of negative affect.  
 Taking negative affect into account may be useful in that it gives a better 
understanding of the relation between subjective status and health, but it may also be 
insufficient. It is well known that neuroticism is characterized by a high propensity for 
acute negative affect (Wang, Shi, & Li, 2009; Widiger, 2009). Individuals who are higher 
on neuroticism tend to experience more negative emotions, such as anger, anxiety, and 
guilt, and are more likely to be depressed (Malouff et al., 2005; Widiger, 2009). Although 
acute negative affect may tap into the broad construct of neuroticism, it does not cover all 
the nuances of neuroticism. Neuroticism is a core personality characteristic that has a 
wide range of effects on health, well-being, and socio-economic status. These effects 
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cannot be explained merely through acute negative affect. For example, as mentioned 
previously, neuroticism is linked to poorer objective SES, which may not be easily 
explained only through negative affect. Objective SES influences subjective status. As 
such, negative affect may not be a sufficient control variable when looking at the 
relations between subjective status and well-being. 
Hypotheses 
In the present research, the relations among subjective status, objective SES, 
depression, neuroticism, and negative affect were examined in a sample of retired 
individuals. The first set of expectations concerned the correlations between subjective 
and objective status markers. Given prior research, it was expected that individuals with 
lower subjective status would have lower objective SES. Moreover, it was expected that 
individuals with lower education would have had lower salaries and held occupations of 
lower prestige during their working years. In other words, the objective SES markers 
were all expected to correlate with each other.   
The second set of expectations concerned the relation of objective and subjective 
status to depression. It was expected that individuals with lower objective SES would 
have more symptoms of depression and that individuals with lower subjective status 
would have more symptoms of depression, and that this would be true above and beyond 
the contribution of objective SES markers as predictors of depression.  
The third set of expectations concerned neuroticism and its relation to depression 
and to objective SES. Given prior research on neuroticism, it was expected that 
individuals with higher neuroticism scores would have more depressive symptoms and 
would have lower objective SES. The above expectations correspond to well-established 
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findings in prior research. In addition, hypotheses were formulated for more novel 
relations.  
The first hypothesis was that individuals higher on neuroticism would have lower 
subjective status. The second hypothesis was that people's subjective status would not be 
related to their depressive symptoms when neuroticism is taken into account. In other 
words, people with lower subjective status would not report more symptoms of 
depression when their neuroticism scores are taken into account.  
As noted above, researchers have used negative affect as a control variable when 
examining the relation between subjective status and health. Because negative affect only 
represents the emotional component of the broad characteristic of neuroticism, it is 
arguably not a sufficient proxy for neuroticism. As such, the third hypothesis was that 
subjective status would predict depression when negative affect is included as a predictor. 
In other words, individuals with lower subjective status would have more symptoms of 
depression, even when their acute negative affect is taken into account.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were retirees who participated in a large longitudinal study looking at 
life adjustment after retirement. They were recruited through associations of retirees and 
newspaper ads. In order to participate in the longitudinal study, participants had to speak 
either French or English, not work more than 10 hours per week at the time of the study, 
and had to have worked full time for a minimum of 20 years. Out of the original sample 
of 433 recruited retirees, 371 retirees completed annual assessments for three consecutive 
years.  
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Measures 
 The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). 
Depressive symptoms were assessed using the CES-D, which is a 20-item questionnaire. 
Individuals respond to each item on a 4-point scale. The items are statements referring to 
different symptoms of depression, which can be categorized into depressed affect, 
positive affect, somatic and retarded activity, and an interpersonal factor (Gotlib & 
Hammen, 2009). Each item is rated on its frequency of occurrence in the past week. The 
scale ranges from 0 (rarely or none of the time – less than 1 day) to 3 (most or all of the 
time – 5-7 days). The scores on the CES-D scale range from 0 to 60, with higher scores 
indicating more depressive symptoms.  
The scale was designed to assess depressive symptoms in the general population, 
and not as a diagnostic tool. It has previously served in epidemiological studies and was 
shown to have good reliability and validity in various populations (Gotlib & Hammen, 
2009). It has good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients ranging from .85 in the 
general population to .90 in a clinically depressed population (Radloff, 1977). Given that 
the scale is meant to measure current depressive symptoms, which are expected to change 
over time, and was designed to be highly sensitive to changes in depressive symptoms 
following life events, test-retest reliability is not expected to be high. As such, it is not 
surprising that test-retest reliability drops with time and ranges from .45 to .70 (Radloff, 
1977).  
In the normative study conducted by Radloff (1977), the author also concluded 
that the scale had good discriminant validity, in that the scale was highly positively 
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correlated with other measures of depression and highly negatively correlated with 
measures of positive affect.  
In the current sample, internal consistency ranged from .87 to .88 (Cronbach's 
alpha) for the full scale and from .25 to .27 for the mean inter-item correlation, measured 
at three different times with one year intervals. In general for this type of measure, mean 
inter-item correlations are not expected to be high. Given that items refer to different 
types of affect and behavior (such as Depressed Affect, Positive Affect, Somatic and 
Retarded Activity, and an Interpersonal factor) and that not all of these are present at the 
same time in the same individuals, inter-item correlations are not expected to be high. In 
the current sample, test-retest reliability ranged from .69 to .70 for one year intervals, 
which is considered acceptable for test-retest reliability. 
 The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism 
was assessed using the NEO-FFI, which is a short version of the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory. It is a 60-item questionnaire, with each item rated on a 5-point 
scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). Each item on the NEO-
FFI is a descriptive statement (e.g., "Sometimes I feel completely worthless"). The NEO-
FFI is meant to measure five different personality domains: neuroticism, extroversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. Only neuroticism is of 
interest for the current study. Average scores for neuroticism for each participant could 
range from 1 to 5. 
 The NEO-FFI was shown to have good test-retest reliability in a community 
sample, with reliability coefficients above .73 for a 30-month interval (Murray, Rawlings, 
Allen, & Trinder, 2003). The NEO-FFI was also found to have good discriminant and 
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convergent validity in a large sample of Air Force trainees (Zeiger, 1996). These findings 
suggest that the NEO-FFI is a valid measure to use even in a highly homogenous group.  
 In the current sample, test-retest reliability for mean neuroticism scores over a 2-
year interval was good (r = .76). Internal consistency for the present sample ranged 
from .87 to .88 (Cronbach's alpha) for the full scale and from .34 to .36 for the mean 
inter-item correlation, measured at two different times with a two year interval.   
 The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (Adler et al., 2000). Subjective 
status was assessed using the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status. The 
MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status is a questionnaire in which there is a 10 
rung ladder presented vertically on the page. The instructions indicate that it is a social 
ladder. People at the top of the ladder have the most money, are the most educated, and 
have the best jobs, whereas the people at the bottom of the ladder have the least money, 
the least education, and the worst jobs. Respondents indicate with an X where they stand 
on that social ladder in relation to other people in society. Instructions for the MacArthur 
Scale of Subjective Social Status were slightly modified for the present study. Because 
participants were retirees, they were asked to refer to the job from which they retired 
when making judgments about their own place in the social ladder.  
 Test-retest reliability for subjective status was found to decrease with time. In a 
sample of adolescents, Goodman and colleagues (2001) found that the subjective status 
scale had a two-month test-retest reliability coefficient of .73. In a community sample, 
the subjective status scale was found to have a six-month test-retest reliability coefficient 
of .62 (Operario et al., 2004). Most research on subjective status is cross sectional, so 
test-retest reliability is not reported. In the current sample, one-year interval test-retest 
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reliability coefficients ranged from .57 to .62, and the two-year interval test-retest 
reliability coefficient was similar, with a value of .65. As such, the test-retest reliability in 
the current sample is relatively low, and below the usual cutoff of .70.  
 The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). Acute negative affect was assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Scale 
(PANAS). The PANAS is a measure of acute negative and positive affect and it consists 
of 20 items. Each item is a word that describes either positive or negative feelings or 
emotions (e.g., "Distressed", "Inspired"). Participants are asked to rate each item in terms 
of the extent that they experienced feeling that way in the past few weeks on a 5-point 
scale ranging from very slightly or not at all (1) to extremely (5). In the current study, 
only the negative affect subscale is of interest. Scores on the negative affect subscale can 
range from 10 to 50.  
 The PANAS has been found to have both good internal validity for the negative 
affect subscale and good construct validity (Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson et al., 
1988). 
 Because the PANAS is meant to measure current negative and positive affect, 
which may vary at different times, test-retest reliability is not expected to be high over 
long periods of time. In the current sample, test-retest reliability for total negative affect 
scores ranged from .58 to .64 over a 1-year interval, and was .50 over a 2-year interval. 
Internal consistency for the present sample ranged from .65 to .77 (Cronbach's alpha) for 
the full scale and from .14 to .23 for the mean inter-item correlation, measured at a one 
year interval.  
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Demographics Questionnaire. Participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire, which assessed their age, gender, and objective SES. Objective SES was 
comprised of education (measured by the number of years completed in the educational 
system), salary at the time of retirement, and occupation before retirement. Each 
participant's occupation was assigned a value using the Standard International 
Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Treiman, 1977). The 
SIOPS is internationally recognized as a measure of occupational prestige, in which each 
occupation is assigned a value ranging from 13 for a garbage collector to 78 for a medical 
doctor. Participants' SIOPS scores were used in the analyses as a measure of their 
occupational prestige.  
Procedure 
 Individuals who were interested in participating in the study first contacted 
researchers through phone or email. If they met the inclusion criteria, they were 
scheduled to come to the laboratory at Concordia University to complete a questionnaire 
booklet, in either French or English. There were no more than six participants completing 
the questionnaires at the same time. The booklet contained the different measures and 
took approximately 3 hours to complete. The booklet also contained other measures, 
which are not relevant to the current study. After completing the questionnaires, 
participants were invited to return for further testing with a one year interval for 3 more 
years. During their first testing session (at Time 0), participants completed the 
demographic questionnaire and the NEO-FFI. During their second testing session (at 
Time 1), which was a year later, participants completed the MacArthur Subjective Social 
Status scale, the PANAS, and the CES-D. During their third testing session (at Time 2), 
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which was two years after the first session, participants again completed the MacArthur 
Subjective Social Status scale, the NEO-FFI, the PANAS, and the CES-D. Participants 
were paid $50 after each testing session.  
Results 
 The assumptions and hypotheses concerned cross-sectional relations between 
subjective status, neuroticism, and depression. Given that the measures of subjective 
status, depression, neuroticism, and negative affect were each administered twice, it was 
possible to test the assumptions and hypotheses twice for each set of measures. See Table 
1 for more information on when each measure was assessed. Demographic information 
(i.e., age and gender) and objective SES (i.e., education, occupation, and salary before 
retirement) were assessed at Time 0 and are included in all the correlational and 
regression analyses. For the first set of analyses, depression at Time 1 was examined with 
subjective status and negative affect at Time 1 and neuroticism at Time 0. For the second 
set of analyses, depression at Time 2 was examined with subjective status, neuroticism, 
and negative affect at Time 2.  
 Means and standard deviations is presented in Table 1. For means and standard 
deviations, subscripts T0, T1, and T2 refer to the time when each measure was 
administered, namely Time 0, Time 1, and Time 2, respectively. At the beginning of the 
study, the mean age of participants was 59.20 (SD = 5.21). Participants had an average of 
15.14 (SD = 2.60) years of education and were earning on average $62,861.86 (SD = 
30,797.30) before their retirement. At both Time 1 and Time 2, participants' subjective 
status was relatively high (MT1 = 7.02, SDT1 = 1.42; MT2 = 7.09, SDT2 = 1.42). 
Participants' average negative affect and depression scores were low (negative affect: MT1 
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= 15.78, SDT1 = 5.60; MT2 = 16.22, SDT2 = 5.70; depression: MT1 = 7.46, SDT1 =7.18; MT2 
= 7.59, SDT2 = 7.39). For each administration of the NEO-FFI, neuroticism scores were 
computed as an average for each participant, with a mean of 2.30 and 2.26 at Time 0 and 
2 respectively (SDT0 = .65, SDT2 = .60). 
 Preliminary analyses showed that there were no statistically significant mean 
differences between the scores of depression (SE = .29, t(372) = -.44, p = .66), subjective 
status (SE = .07, t(363) = -.53, p = .60), and negative affect (SE = .27, t(371) = -1.46, p 
= .15) between Time 1 and 2. There were no statistically significant mean differences 
between the scores of neuroticism between Time 0 and Time 2 (SE = .02, t(369) = .73, p 
= .47).  
Before conducting correlational and regression analyses, data was examined for 
assumptions of normality, namely for skewness and kurtosis. Extreme outliers (i.e., 
scores three standard deviations above or below the mean) were converted to the highest 
(or lowest) possible score within three standard deviations of that distribution. For salary, 
there were some very high values (n = 3) that were changed to the value of $150 000, 
which was three standard deviations above the mean. The mean for subjective status at 
Time 1 and 2 was 7, with a standard deviation of 1.42. As such, scores below 3 (nT1 = 2, 
nT2 = 4) were converted to 3. For negative affect, there were some high scores (nT1 = 7, 
nT2 = 6), which were converted to the highest score below three standard deviations 
above the mean, which was the value of 32 at Time 1 and 33 at Time 2. Finally, there 
were some very high scores of depression (nT1 = 5, nT2 = 9), which were converted to the 
value of 29 at Time 1 and 2, as this was the highest score below three standard deviations 
above the mean. Two participants at Time 1 and two participants at Time 2 had 
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simultaneously high scores (above 3 standard deviations above the mean) on both the 
depression scale and the negative affect scale. 
 Correlations between all the measures are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
presents the first set of correlations; it contains correlations for depression, subjective 
status, and acute negative affect at Time 1 and neuroticism at Time 0. Table 3 presents 
the second set of correlations: it contains correlations for depression, subjective status, 
acute negative affect, and neuroticism at Time 2. The objective SES factors, namely 
education level, occupational prestige, and salary earned before retirement, were assessed 
Time 0 and the correlations of those factors are also presented in Tables 2 and 3. In 
describing correlational results, the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the first and second set of 
correlations, respectively.  
 The first set of expectations was that subjective status will be correlated with 
objective SES factors and that objective SES factors will be intercorrelated with each 
other. In line with expectations, participants with higher subjective status completed more 
years of education (r1(383) = .27, r2(367) = .20, ps < .001), held occupations of greater 
prestige (r1(383) = .20, r2(367) = .27, ps < .001), and had higher salaries (r1(308) = .40, 
r2(295) = .37, ps < .001).The three objective SES factors were positively correlated, with 
correlations ranging from .39 (p < .001) for salary and education to .47 (p < .001) for 
education and occupational prestige. In other words, participants with higher education 
had held occupations of greater prestige and had higher salaries.  
Another set of expectations was that subjective status and objective SES will be 
negatively correlated with depression. In line with expectations, participants with lower 
subjective status had more symptoms of depression (r1(383) = -.26, r2(367) = -.31, ps 
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< .001). In addition, participants with lower objective SES also had more symptoms of 
depression. In the first set of correlational analyses, participants with less education 
(r1(390) = -.12, p = .022), who held occupations of lower prestige (r1(390) = -.12, p 
= .02), and who had lower salaries (r1(314) = -.17, p = .009) had more symptoms of 
depression. The same results emerged in the second set of correlational analyses, except 
that the relation between education and depression was non-significant (occupational 
prestige: r2(370) = -.11, p = .033; salary: r2(299) = -.19, p = .01; education: r2(370) = -.07, 
p = .221). 
Another expectation was that neuroticism will be positively correlated with 
depression. As expected, participants with higher neuroticism scores had more depressive 
symptoms (r1(391) = .48, r2(368) = .65, ps < .001).  
An additional expectation was that neuroticism will be negatively correlated with 
objective SES. This expectation was confirmed. In the first set of correlational analyses, 
participants with higher neuroticism scores had completed fewer years of education 
(r1(390) = -.12, p = .021), had held occupations of lower prestige (r1(390) = -.17, p 
= .001), and their salaries had been lower (r1(339) = -.31, p < .001). The same results 
emerged in the second set of correlational analyses, except that the relation between 
neuroticism and education was non-significant (occupational prestige: r2(368) = -.11, p 
= .032; salary: r2(296) = -.24, p < .001; education: r2(368) = -.05, p = .313). 
The first hypothesis was that people with higher neuroticism scores also have 
lower subjective status. This hypothesis was confirmed (r1(383) = -.30, r2(367) = -.29, ps 
< .001).  
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 A series of linear regressions was conducted to test the assumptions and 
hypotheses. In each of the regressions predicting depressive symptoms, age and gender 
were predictors, in addition to objective SES factors, namely education, occupational 
prestige, and income before retirement. This set of predictors was part of all the 
regression analyses. Additional predictors were included to test different hypotheses.  
Is subjective status a significant predictor of depressive symptoms, above and 
beyond objective SES? 
Two parallel sets of regression analyses were conducted to assess the relation 
between subjective status and depression. The first linear regression predicted depression 
at Time 1. The predictors were objective SES (education, occupational prestige, and 
salary before retirement) and demographic variables (age and gender) at Time 0, and 
subjective status at Time 1. The second linear regression predicted depression at Time 2. 
The predictors were the same objective SES and demographic variables assessed at Time 
0 and subjective status at Time 2. In describing results, subscripts T1 and T2 refer to the 
first and second set of regression analyses which predicted depression at Time 1 and 
depression at Time 2, respectively.  
The assumption was that individuals with lower subjective status have more 
symptoms of depression, above and beyond their objective SES. Overall, the model 
explained a statistically significant portion of the variance in depression in both sets of 
analyses (R2T1 = .09, FT1(6, 303) = 4.90, p < .001; R
2
T2 = .09, FT2(6, 290) = 4.54, p 
< .001). As can be seen in Tables 4 and 5, subjective status was indeed a statistically 
significant predictor of depressive symptoms (bT1 = -.15, p = .017; bT2 = -.18, p = .003), 
above and beyond the influence of objective SES factors. Although the zero order 
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correlations between objective SES factors and depression were statistically significant 
(see Tables 2 and 3), objective SES factors were not statistically significant predictors of 
depression when subjective status was part of the analysis.  
Age also had an effect on people's depressive symptoms, whereby older 
participants reported more depressive symptoms (bT1 = .18, p = .003; bT2 = .13, p = .026). 
No other factors were statistically significant predictors of depressive symptoms in these 
regression analyses. 
Is subjective social status a significant predictor of depressive symptoms when 
neuroticism is also taken into account? 
The second hypothesis was that people's depressive symptoms are not related to 
their subjective status when neuroticism is taken into account. Two parallel sets of 
regression analyses were conducted to assess the relation between neuroticism, 
depression, and subjective status. The first linear regression predicted depression at Time 
1. The predictors were objective SES (i.e., education, occupational prestige, and salary 
before retirement), demographic variables (i.e., age and gender), subjective status at Time 
1, and neuroticism at Time 0. The second linear regression predicted depression at Time 
2. The predictors were the same objective SES and demographic variables, as well as 
subjective status at Time 2, and neuroticism at Time 2.  
Overall, the model explained a much larger portion of the variance in depression 
with neuroticism as a predictor, for both sets of analyses (R2T1 = .25, FT1(7, 302) = 13.99, 
p < .001; R2T2 = .40, FT2(7, 289) = 27.94, p < .001). As shown in Tables 6 and 7, 
participants who had higher neuroticism scores had more depressive symptoms (bT1 = .42, 
bT2 = .59, ps < .001). In line with the second hypothesis, subjective status was not a 
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statistically significant predictor of depression when neuroticism was taken into account 
(bT1 = -.07, p = .238; bT2 = -.08, p = .125). Other than neuroticism, the only other 
statistically significant predictor of depression was age (bT1 = .20, p < .001; bT2 = .16, p 
= .001). 
In the context of examining whether subjective status is related to depressive 
symptoms, is a measure of acute negative affect a good proxy for neuroticism? 
The third hypothesis was that acute negative affect is not a good proxy for 
neuroticism when looking at the relation between subjective status and depression. In 
other words, when negative affect is taken into account, subjective status continues to 
play a significant role in predicting depression. This hypothesis was tested in a two 
different ways. First, the relation between subjective status, depression, and negative 
affect was analyzed. Second, the relation between subjective status, depression, negative 
affect, and neuroticism was analyzed.  
Two parallel sets of regressions analyses were conducted to assess the relation 
between subjective status, depression, and negative affect. In the first linear regression, 
the outcome variable was depression at Time 1. The predictors were objective SES (i.e., 
education, occupational prestige, and salary before retirement), demographic variables 
(i.e., age and gender), subjective status at Time 1, and negative affect at Time 1. In the 
second linear regression, the outcome variable was depression at Time 2. The predictors 
were the same objective SES and demographic variables, as well as subjective status and 
negative affect at Time 2.  
Overall, this model explained a statistically significant portion of the variance in 
depression in both sets of analyses (R2T1 = .38, FT1(7, 302) = 26.91, p < .001; R
2
T2 = .39, 
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FT2(7, 288) = 26.48, p < .001). As shown in Tables 8 and 9, negative affect was a 
statistically significant predictor of depressive symptoms (bT1 = .55, bT2 = .56, ps < .001). 
It is not surprising because individuals who experience depressive symptoms also 
experience negative affect. In addition, the third hypothesis was supported; even when 
negative affect was taken into account, subjective status continued to play at least a 
marginally significant role in depressive symptoms (bT1 = -.09, p = .082; bT2 = -.11, p 
= .034). In addition to subjective status and negative affect, age was also a statistically 
significant predictor of depression (bT1 = .14, p = .004; bT2 = .12, p = .015). Surprisingly, 
gender was a statistically significant predictor of depression at Time 1, but not at Time 2 
(bT1 = -.12, p = .014; bT2 = -.05, p = .343), whereby men had more symptoms of 
depression. 
To assess the relation between subjective status, depression, negative affect, and 
neuroticism, two parallel sets of regression analyses were conducted. In the first linear 
regression, the outcome variable was depression at Time 1. The predictors were objective 
SES (i.e., education, occupational prestige, and salary before retirement), demographic 
variables (i.e., age and gender), subjective status and negative affect at Time 1, and 
neuroticism at Time 0. In the second linear regression, the outcome variable was 
depression at Time 2. The predictors were the same objective SES and demographic 
variables, as well as subjective status, negative affect, and neuroticism at Time 2.  
Overall, the model explained a statistically significant portion of the variance in 
depression in both sets of analyses, slightly more than the models with either neuroticism 
or negative affect alone (R2T1 = .43, FT1(8, 301) = 28.82, p < .001; R
2
T2 = .49, FT2(8, 287) 
= 34.31, p < .001). Results for each predictor's individual contribution are shown in 
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Tables 10 and 11. When both acute negative affect and neuroticism were considered 
together, both were statistically significant predictors of depressive symptoms. In other 
words, participants with higher neuroticism scores had more symptoms of depression (bT1 
= .25, bT2 = .39, ps < .001), above and beyond their acute negative affect. These findings 
add support to the third hypothesis, which states that negative affect is not a sufficient 
proxy for neuroticism. Negative affect and neuroticism explain unique variances in 
depression. Age also remained a statistically significant predictor of depression (bT1 = .16, 
p = .001; bT2 = .14, p = .002). In addition, gender was a statistically significant predictor 
of depression at Time 1, but not at Time 2 (bT1 = -.13, p = .007; bT2 = -.04, p = .385). 
Discussion 
 Previous research that looked at the relation between subjective status and health 
had found that subjective status affected health, above the effects of objective SES (such 
as education, occupation, and income). Table 12 presents detailed information on studies 
that looked at the relation between subjective status and a psychosocial health outcome. It 
is important to note that many authors who included a psychosocial factor into their 
models saw a decrease in the predictive power of subjective status on psychosocial health. 
For example, Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer (2006) saw a drastic decrease in the 
association between subjective status and mental health when they included psychosocial 
factors in the model, such as social support and trust. Similar decreases in the predictive 
power of subjective status on self-rated health were observed by Adler and colleagues 
(2000) and Lundberg and Kristenson (2008), when psychosocial factors were taken into 
account. As such, the current study aimed to assess whether a broad personality 
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characteristic, namely neuroticism, reduces the link between subjective status and health. 
The health outcome in this study was depression.  
 The reasoning behind using neuroticism as the third variable in the relation 
between subjective status and depression is in the impact that high neuroticism has on 
many aspects of life. As mentioned previously, neuroticism is a broad personality 
construct that is characterized by a propensity for negative emotions and maladaptive 
behaviors (such as aggression, hostility, and impulsivity; Widiger, 2009). Individuals 
with higher neuroticism are more likely to have a mood and anxiety disorders, and to 
engage in substance abuse (Malouff et al., 2005). As such, it was expected that 
individuals with higher neuroticism will have more symptoms of depression in the 
current study. Higher neuroticism is also linked to poor self-representation and self-
esteem (Judge et al., 1998; Watson et al., 1994; Watson et al., 2002). Individuals with 
higher neuroticism report poorer health (Lahey, 2009; Löckenhoff et al., 2012; Okun & 
George, 1984; Vassend et al., 2012), have lower SES (Judge et al., 1999; Roberts et al., 
2003), experience more negative life events (Magnus et al., 1993; Kandler et al., 2012), 
and have poorer interactions with others, in that they behave more submissively and have 
lower status in groups (Anderson et al., 2001; Gilbert & Allan, 1994). As such, it was 
hypothesized that higher neuroticism is linked to lower subjective status and that when 
neuroticism is taken into account, individuals with lower subjective status do not have 
more symptoms of depression. Results from the current study supported this hypothesis.  
Before assessing the effects of neuroticism on the relation between subjective 
status and depression, it was important to determine whether subjective status was a 
significant predictor of depression in the current sample, above and beyond the influence 
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of objective SES. As such, the relation between subjective status, objective SES, and 
depression was examined. In line with previous research, subjective status was indeed a 
statistically significant predictor of depression above the effects of objective SES factors. 
In addition, although the bivariate associations between objective SES factors and 
depression were statistically significant, objective SES factors were not statistically 
significant predictors of depression when subjective status was considered. These 
findings are in agreement with most of the research conducted to date.  
Before examining the effects of neuroticism on the relation between subjective 
status and depression, the correlations of neuroticism with subjective status and with 
depression were analyzed. In line with expectations, higher neuroticism was indeed 
associated with more depressive symptoms. In addition, higher neuroticism was also 
associated with lower subjective status. Having established the bivariate association of 
neuroticism with subjective status and depression, it was then possible to look at the 
relation between subjective status, depression, and neuroticism. As hypothesized, when 
neuroticism was included in the analyses, subjective status did not predict depression. In 
other words, when individuals’ neuroticism scores were taken into account, individuals 
with lower subjective status did not have more symptoms of depression. These results 
were observed for two different sets of data, collected at different times. 
In light of the present findings, whereby subjective status had little influence on 
depression when neuroticism and objective SES factors were considered, the utility of a 
subjective status scale is bound to be questioned. As mentioned previously, subjective 
status only partially reflects objective socio-economic status. Most of the variance in 
subjective status is not accounted for by objective measures of economic status (Brown et 
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al., 2008; Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). Singh-Manoux and colleagues (2003), in their 
analysis of subjective status, included subjective measures of financial security and 
satisfaction with standard of living in predicting subjective status. Because they included 
these subjective measures, they found that 48% of the variance in subjective status was 
accounted for. However, these measures may also reflect psychosocial factors in addition 
to objective SES. As such, it is not possible to ascertain which psychosocial factors play a 
more important role in the determination of subjective status. It is possible that factors 
such as self-esteem, social support, perceived health, and probably a number of other 
factors influence how individuals perceive their status in society.  
In addition to the fact that subjective status reflects other factors apart from 
objective SES, subjective status may be affected by the extent to which individuals value 
social status, which may further “bias” the results. For instance, an individual who is not 
very concerned with his status may not perceive himself at the bottom of the ladder, 
regardless of his actual objective SES. In contrast, an individual who is very concerned 
with his status, and unsatisfied with his present socio-economic situation, may perceive 
himself to be lower on the ladder. As a result, subjective status may reflect different 
factors in different individuals. So it may be difficult to determine the validity of such a 
measure. In addition, considering the fact that subjective status does not consistently have 
acceptable test-retest reliability (Kline, 2009), it is difficult to ascertain its usefulness in 
research settings. If one considers personality characteristics alongside objective SES 
factors, subjective status does not significantly contribute to the explained variance in 
health. It would be beneficial, in future research, to consider factors such as life 
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satisfaction, personality, and objective SES when looking at health, as it would provide a 
more complete and unambiguous picture of what influences health. 
 In the current study, individuals with higher neuroticism scores had more 
symptoms of depression. Two different sets of analyses were conducted to look at the 
influence of subjective status and neuroticism on depression. The first analysis included 
neuroticism scores from the first administration of the NEO-FFI and depression scores 
from the first administration of the CES-D, which was a year later. Essentially, in that 
analysis, individuals’ neuroticism scores predicted their depression scores a year later. 
Although the association between neuroticism and depression was strong in the first 
analysis, it was even more so in the second analysis. The second analysis contained 
scores of neuroticism and depression assessed at the same time. This provides further 
evidence that neuroticism is highly linked to depression and should be taken into 
consideration when assessing this outcome measure. Most research discussed in this 
paper did not control for neuroticism when looking at depression or a related construct 
(such as negative affect or mood dysfunction). Not accounting for neuroticism when 
looking at depression may lead to specification error, which reduces the accuracy of the 
results.  
 The question is to what extent is personality, specifically neuroticism, malleable? 
The neurotic personality characteristic may be evolutionarily adaptive, in that it helps 
individuals be more conscious of possible threats (Denissen & Penke, 2008), but it is 
highly maladaptive in non-threatening situations. An individual born into an 
impoverished and hostile environment may benefit more from having higher levels of 
neuroticism than an individual born into a stable environment. As such, the level of 
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neuroticism present in individuals may be shaped not only by genetic predisposition, but 
also by early childhood experiences (McFarlane et al., 2005). For example, a child 
growing up in a dangerous environment may exhibit more neuroticism. However, if he or 
she moves to a more stable environment, levels of neuroticism may eventually decrease. 
This is evident by the moderate decrease of neuroticism in adulthood (Costa et al., 1986; 
Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). In addition, research shows that important life events affect 
the level of neuroticism. When individuals experience positive life events, such as 
marriage or job satisfaction, their level of neuroticism decreases (Roberts et al., 2003; 
Roberts and Chapman, 2000). In contrast, when individuals experience negative life 
events, such as divorce, long-term unemployment, or conflict, their neuroticism scores 
increase (Costa, Herbst, McCrae, & Siegler, 2000; Lucas, Clark, Georgelis, & Diener, 
2004; Robins, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000; Scollon & Diener, 2006). Although neuroticism 
may be affected by important life events, it is important to note that neuroticism also 
affects the type and frequency of such events. For example, some authors have found that 
individuals with higher neuroticism scores experience more negative life events 
following their assessment (Lüdtke, Roberts, Trautwein, & Nagy, 2011). As such, it is 
difficult to disentangle the influence of neuroticism on important life events and the 
influence of such events on neuroticism. Nevertheless, there are other ways in which 
neuroticism scores may be reduced. Neuroticism is potentially malleable through therapy. 
Cognitive-behavioral therapy has shown to decrease levels of neuroticism in individuals, 
as well as drug therapy with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs; Glinski & 
Page, 2010; Tang et al, 2009). In summary, although neuroticism is a relatively stable 
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personality characteristic, it may nevertheless be diminished through life experiences and 
with the help of therapy.  
  The current research also showed that negative affect is not a good proxy for 
neuroticism when looking at health. Although a prominent feature of neuroticism is the 
propensity for negative affect, negative affect does not encompass all the different 
features of neuroticism, namely the personality characteristics. Most people will 
experience a certain degree of positive and negative affect on a daily basis. Negative 
affect may affect people’s current perception of their health, but in its volatile state, it 
does not necessarily affect health in the long term. As such, both personality features and 
affective states may be necessary to disentangle the influence of each one on health. 
Limitations 
 A potential limitation of this study is the age of participants. Although 
neuroticism is present even in adolescence, the full effects of neuroticism may not be 
visible until later in life. Given that younger individuals may not yet have a stable career 
and may still be in school, the full socio-economic effects of neuroticism may not be 
visible. In older adulthood, the differences between the individuals with high and low 
neuroticism may be more pronounced. Older individuals with higher neuroticism may 
have visibly lower economic status, less emotional support, and more health problems 
than individuals with lower neuroticism. In addition, they may have had more stressful 
life events. As a result, they may have more psychological problems, and they may be 
more depressed. Nevertheless, younger individuals with higher neuroticism may also 
have lower SES and more depression. These individuals may have lower school 
performance, may be more likely to lose a job, and may have less social support. These 
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factors could affect both their perceived health and their susceptibility for depression. So 
it may be beneficial to assess the role of neuroticism in depression and in the health of 
younger individuals. 
 Another possible limitation of this study is the generalizability of these results to 
other health outcomes. As noted previously, individuals with higher neuroticism have a 
greater risk of depression. Neuroticism eliminated the association between subjective 
status and depression. It is likely that, given the high comorbidity between neuroticism 
and other mental disorders, neuroticism would also reduce or even eliminate the effects 
of subjective status on psychological health. However, it remains to be seen whether 
similar results will be found in the relation between subjective status and physical health 
problems. Although the present findings cannot be generalized to physical health, it is 
important to note that one study found that neuroticism eliminated the relation between 
subjective status and global self-rated health (Alfonsi, 2011).  
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Table 1  
Means and Standard Deviations of Measures of Objective Socio-Economic Status, Subjective Status, 
Depression, Neuroticism, and Negative Affect, and Age. 
 
Note. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., 
more years of education or higher subjective status). n = number of participants in the sample; M = mean; 
SD = standard deviation; Time 0, Time 1, and Time 2 have a year interval in between each assessment.  
  
 Time 0  Time 1  Time 2 
Variable n M SD  n M  SD  n M  SD 
Age 433        59.20           5.21         
Education  392        15.14           2.60         
Salary 341 62,861.86  30,797.30         
Occupational Prestige 392        53.38           8.28         
Subjective Status      385   7.02      1.42  369   7.09  1.42 
Depression     393   7.46      7.18  373   7.59  7.39 
Neuroticism 433         2.30             .65      370   2.26    .60 
Negative Affect     393 15.78      5.60  372 16.22  5.70 
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Table 2 
Summary of Correlations Between Education, Occupational Prestige, Salary, and Neuroticism at Time 
Zero and Subjective Status, Depression, and Negative Affect at Time 1. 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Education (T0) -       
2. Occupational Prestige (T0)    .47** -      
3. Salary (T0)    .39**    .40** -     
4. Subjective Status (T1)    .27**    .20**   .40** -    
5. Depression (T1)  -.12*  -.12*  -.17** -.26** -   
6. Neuroticism (T0)  -.12*   -.17**   -.31** -.30** .48** -  
7. Negative Affect (T1)  -.10* -.04 -.09 -.16** .61** .42** - 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. N = 393. For some correlations, the sample size is lower due to missing values. For each 
variable, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more years of education or more depressive 
symptoms); T0 = Time zero; T1 = Time 1.  
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Table 3 
Summary of Correlations Between Education, Occupational Prestige, and Salary at Time Zero and 
Subjective Status, Depression, Neuroticism, and Negative Affect at Time 2. 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Education (T0) -       
2. Occupational Prestige (T0)     .47** -      
3. Salary (T0)     .39**     .40** -     
4. Subjective Status (T2)     .20**     .27**    .37** -    
5. Depression (T2)  -.07   -.11*   -.19** -.31** -   
6. Neuroticism (T2)  -.05   -.11*   -.24** -.29** .65** -  
7. Negative Affect (T2)   -.12*  -.09   -.13* -.21** .64** .60** - 
 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. N = 392. For some correlations, the sample size is lower due to missing values. For each 
variable, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more years of education or more depressive 
symptoms); T0 = Time zero; T2 = Time 2. 
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Table 4 
Linear Regression Analysis predicting Depression Scores at Time 1 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, and Subjective Status Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender  -.920   .758 -.072  -1.214 .226  
Age    .232   .077  .176    3.003 .003  
Education  -.088   .168 -.035    -.527 .599  
Salary  <.001 <.001 -.069    -.982 .327  
Occupational Prestige  -.035   .051 -.044    -.673 .502  
Subjective Status (T1) -.687   .286 -.147  -2.400 .017  
    .088    
 
Note. N = 310. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher subjective status); T1 = Time 1.  
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Table 5 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 2 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, and Subjective Status Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender  -.480   .790 -.037   -.607 .544  
Age   .177   .079  .133   2.240 .026  
Education   .025   .172  .010     .148 .883  
Salary  <.001 <.001 -.090  -1.255 .210  
Occupational Prestige   -.036   .055 -.044    -.653 .514  
Subjective Status (T2)  -.945   .315 -.184  -3.001 .003  
    .086    
 
Note. N = 297. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher subjective status); T2 = Time 2. 
  
SUBJECTIVE STATUS, DEPRESSION, AND NEUROTICISM 89 
 
Table 6 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 1 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, and Neuroticism Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender  -1.209  .692 -.094  -1.747   .082  
Age     .264  .071  .200   3.738 <.001  
Education    -.160  .153 -.063  -1.041   .299  
Salary   <.001 <.001  .013     .202   .840  
Occupational Prestige    -.008   .047 -.011    -.179   .858  
Subjective Status (T1)   -.314  .265 -.067  -1.183   .238  
Neuroticism (T0)   4.355  .551  .421   7.907 <.001  
    .245    
 
Note. N = 310. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher neuroticism); T1 = Time 1; T0 = Time zero. 
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Table 7 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 2 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, and Neuroticism Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender   -.413   .639 -.032     -.646   .519  
Age    .215   .064  .162    3.349   .001  
Education  -.108   .139 -.042    -.777   .438  
Salary  <.001 <.001  .033     .554   .580  
Occupational Prestige  -.030   .044 -.037    -.684   .494  
Subjective Status (T2)  -.398   .259 -.078  -1.540   .125  
Neuroticism (T2) 6.701   .540  .590  12.409 <.001  
    .404    
 
Note. N = 297. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher neuroticism); T2 = Time 2. 
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Table 8 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 1 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, and Negative Affect Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender  -1.553   .626 -.121  -2.480   .014  
Age    .187   .064   .141    2.927   .004  
Education   -.034   .138 -.014    -.247   .805  
Salary  <.001 <.001 -.082  -1.404   .161  
Occupational Prestige -.030   .042 -.038    -.715   .475  
Subjective Status (T1) -.413   .237 -.088  -1.746   .082  
Negative Affect (T1)  .670   .056   .552  12.041 <.001  
    .384    
 
Note. N = 310. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or more acute negative affect); T1 = Time 1. 
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Table 9 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 2 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, and Negative Affect Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender   -.614   .646 -.047     -.949  .343  
Age    .159   .065  .119    2.449  .015  
Education    .108   .141  .042      .769  .443  
Salary  <.001 <.001 -.072   -1.233  .219  
Occupational Prestige  -.022   .045 -.028     -.503  .616  
Subjective Status (T2)  -.553   .260 -.108   -2.127  .034  
Negative Affect (T2)   .689   .057  .564  12.034 <.001  
    .392    
 
Note. N = 296. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or more acute negative affect); T2 = Time 2. 
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Table 10 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 1 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, Negative Affect, and Neuroticism Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender  -1.632   .602 -.127    -2.712   .007  
Age     .213   .061  .161     3.458   .001  
Education    -.085   .133 -.034     -.638   .524  
Salary   <.001 <.001 -.030     -.535   .593  
Occupational Prestige  -.015   .041 -.019     -.374   .709  
Subjective Status (T1)  -.230   .230 -.049   -1.001   .318  
Negative Affect (T1)   .570   .057  .469  10.021 <.001  
Neuroticism (T0)  2.611   .508  .253   5.135 <.001  
    .434    
 
Note. N = 310. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher neuroticism); T1 = Time 1; T0 = Time zero. 
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Table 11 
Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Depression Scores at Time 2 with Demographic, Objective Socio-
Economic Status, Subjective Status, Negative Affect, and Neuroticism Predictors. 
Predictors  B SE Beta R2 t p  
        
Gender   -.517   .594 -.040    -.870   .385  
Age    .190   .060  .142   3.171   .002  
Education   -.010   .130 -.004   -.077   .939  
Salary   <.001 <.001  .002     .035   .972  
Occupational Prestige  -.023   .041 -.029    -.569   .570  
Subjective Status (T2)  -.339   .241 -.066  -1.407   .160  
Negative Affect (T2)   .437   .063  .358   6.968 <.001  
Neuroticism (T2) 4.416   .597  .389   7.392 <.001  
    .489    
 
Note. N = 296. For each variable, excluding gender, higher numbers correspond to more of the construct (e.g., more 
years of education or higher neuroticism); T2 = Time 2. 
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Table 12 
Summary of Results from Studies Containing a Psychosocial Outcome Variable and a Subjective Status Predictor. 










variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 











153 SS-S Health r =.18* b = .10 Objective SES 
(composite of 3 SES 
factors) 
r = .40* 
     Pessimism r = -.37* b = -.23* Household income r = .22* 
     Perceived 
control over life 
r = .26* b = .23* Education r = .32* 
     Active coping r = .24* b = .18* Occupation r = .11 
     Passive coping r = -.33* b = -.17* Negative affect r = -.31* 
     Chronic stress r = -.36* b = -.24*   








sample of adults 








scores 16 and 
above) 
OR = 9.10*(BW) 
OR = 31.3*(WW) 
OR = 6.24*(BM) 
OR = 6.91*(WM) 
OR = 21.31*(BW) 
OR= 43.3*(WW) 
OR = 5.89*(BM) 
OR = 23.56*(WM) 
Age n/a 
     Health 
(dichotomized: 
good/poor) 
OR = 21.31*(BW) 
OR = 43.3*(WW) 
OR = 5.89*(BM) 
OR = 23.56*(WM) 
OR = 5.82*(BW) 
OR = 11.05*(WW) 
OR = 3.28*(BM) 
OR= 4.74*(WM) 
Education r = .19*(BW) 
r = .32*(WW) 
r = .18*(BM) 
r = .40*(WM) 
      Analyses were conducted for 
each group separately: 
BW = Black women,  
WW = White women,  
BM = Black men,  
WM = White men 
 
Higher odds of having depression 
in the lowest SS group relative to 
the highest SS group, controlling 
only for age. Higher odds of 
Higher odds of having depression 
in the lowest SS group relative to 
the highest SS group. Higher 
odds of having good health in the 
highest SS group relative to the 
lowest SS group. 
Income  r = .19*(BW) 
r = .51*(WW) 
r = .23*(BM) 
r = .53*(WM) 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
having good health in the highest 
SS group relative to the lowest 
SS group, controlling only for 
age 
              Occupation r = .15*(BW) 
r = .28*(WW) 
r = .11*(BM) 
r = .35*(WM) 






122 SS-C  Emotional 
exhaustion 
r = -.46* b = -2.83* Education r = .11 
     Depersonaliza-
tion of patients 
r = -.26* b = -2.99* Professional affiliation n/a 
     Sense of 
accomplishment 
r = .32* b = 2.64* Staff-to-patient ratio r = -.26* 
     Positive aspects 
of caregiving 
r = .55* b = 5.88* Daily hours of work r = -.02 
                Years worked with 
older adults 
r = .18 








2095 SS-US  Physical health 
(dichotomized: 
poor/good) 
r = .27 OR = 1.22* Age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, region of 
residence, nativity, 
years living in US 
n/a 
    SS-C   Higher odds of good self-rated 
health with higher SS. 
 
Education r =  .34 
(polychoric 
correlation) 





   Income r =  .24 
(polychoric 
correlation) 
        Occupation n/a 
        Satisfaction with 
economic opportunity 
r =  .34 
(Spearman's 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
correlation) 









65 (M) & 
66 (F) 
7433 SS-S Health 
(dichotomized: 
poor/good) 
OR = .73*(M)  
OR = .78*(W) 
OR = .83*(M)  
OR = .90*(W) 
Age n/a 
     Depression 
(dichotomized: 
present in 4 or 
more 
symptoms) 
OR = .72*(M)  
OR = .76*(F) 
OR = .76*(M)  
OR = .82*(W) 
Marital status n/a 
      Lower odds of poor health or 4 or 
more depressive symptoms with 
increasing SS, when adjusted for 
age and marital status. 
Lower odds of having poor self-
rated health or 4 or more 
depressive symptoms with higher 
SS. 
Education n/a 
        Occupational class n/a 





















γ = .25*(pregnancy)  
γ = .18*(postpartum) 
OR = 2.53*(pregnancy)  
OR = 2.04*(postpartum) 
Education n/a 




γ = .22*(pregnancy)  
γ = .26*(postpartum) 
OR = 2.32*(pregnancy)  
OR = 2.08*(postpartum) 
Income n/a 
     Depression 
(dichotomized: 
present in 
scores 23 or 
above) 
γ = -.33* OR = 1.95* Public assistance 
(yes/no) 
n/a 
     Stress 
(dichotomized: 
high stress 
γ = -.24* OR = 3.24* Homelessness 
(experienced/never 
n/a 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
present in 
scores 28 or 
above) 
experienced) 
            γ values refer to the association of 
SS with good physical and 
emotional health, and the 
presence of depression and high 
stress. 
Higher odds of having good 
physical and emotional health in 
the high SS group relative to the 
low SS group. Higher odds of the 
presence of depression and high 
stress in the low SS group 
relative to the high SS group. 
Basic utility (shut 











838 SS-FS Smoking n/a OR = 1.06 (SS-FS)  
OR = .75*(SS-SC) 
Age n/a 
    SS-SC+   Lower odds of smoking with 
higher school subjective status. 
Gender n/a 
        Ethnicity n/a 
        School grade level n/a 
        Parental education 
level 
r = .22*(SS-FS)  
r = .15*(SS-SC) 
















1745 SS-OP+ Physical health r = .11* b = .04 Age, gender, nativity 
(US/foreign born) 
n/a 
     Emotional 
health 
r =.13* b = .04 Education r = .26* 
(Spearman's 
correlation) 
     Health 
(dichotomized: 
r =.16* (Spearman's correlation) OR = 1.08* Income r = .25* 
(Spearman's 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
poor/good)  correlation) 
       Higher odds of having good or 
better health with a one unit 




















r = .15* OR = .89 Age r = .01 





r = -.28* OR = .46* Education r = .18* 
     Drug intake 
(non-user/user) 
r = -.14* OR = .97 Income r = .24* 
        Occupation r = .08 
      (Spearman's correlations) Lower odds of having 
psychological distress in high SS 
group relative to low SS group. 
Childhood SES r = -.16* 
                  (Spearman's 
correlations) 
Ghaed & Gallo 
(2007)  
Women in the 
US 
Mean: 41 92 SS-US  Depression b = -.68(SS-US)  
b = -1.21 (SS-C)  
b = -.43(SS-US)  
b = -1.18 (SS-C) 
Age n/a 
    SS-C+ Trait anxiety b = -.54(SS-US)  
b = -1.08*(SS-C) 
b = -.59 (SS-US)  
b = -1.02*(SS-C) 
Ethnicity n/a 
     Stress b = -.13 (SS-US)  
b = -.63*(SS-C) 
b = -.12(SS-US)  
b = -.58*(SS-C) 
Objective SES 
(education, household 
income, job title) 
n/a 
     Pessimism b = -.28(SS-US)  
b = -1.02*(SS-C) 
b = -.18(SS-US)  
b = -.98*(SS-C) 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
     Social support b = -.04(SS-US)  
b = .98(SS-C) 
b = -.04(SS-US)  
b = .84(SS-C) 
  
      Beta coefficients refer to the 
association between SS (US and 
community) and the outcome 
variables, controlling for age and 
ethnicity. 










149 SS-S Sleep 
disturbance 
b = -.02 (W) 
b = -.51*(B) 
b = -.37*(A) 
b = -.02 Gender n/a 
      Standardized beta coefficient in 
simple regression for each 
separate ethnic group: 
W = White American  
B = Black American 
A = Asian American 
 
 Ethnicity n/a 
        Occupational status 
(working or not) 
n/a 
        Body mass index n/a 
        Depression n/a 























r = .23* 
(Spearman's correlation) 
B = .24* (year 1)  




r = -.07* 
 
       Unstandardized beta coefficients 
in LR. Higher subjective status 
from year 1 was associated with 
higher self-rated health in year 1 
and year 4. 
Gender 
(0=female,1=male) 
r = -.11 
(Spearman's 
correlation) 
        Ethnicity (0=Back, 
1=White) 
r = -.05 
(Spearman's 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
correlation) 
        Parental education 
level 
n/a 











1570 SS-US+ Physical health 
(dichotomized: 
poor/good) 
r = .26* (SS-US)  
r = .24*(SS-C) 
OR = .84*(SS-US)  
OR = .87*(SS-C) 
Age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, English 
proficiency, years 
living in US 
n/a 




r = .24* (SS-US)  
r = .24*(SS-C) 
OR = .84*(SS-US)  
OR = .81*(SS-C) 
Education r = .36* (SS-
US)  
r = .31*(SS-C) 
     Psychological 
distress 
r = -.10* (SS-US)  
r = -.09*(SS-C) 
b = -.28*(SS-US)  
b = -.30*(SS-C) 
Household income r = .32* (SS-
US)  
r = .26*(SS-C) 
        Occupation n/a 
      (Spearman's correlations) Lower odds of having good 
physical and emotional health 
with lower SS. 
Social desirability n/a 










240 SS-S Depression B = -1.09*(SS-S)  
B = -2.02*(SS-C) 
B = .02 (SS-S)  
B = -1.82*(SS-C) 
Age, gender, ethnicity, 
province, number of 
people in household 
n/a 
    SS-C Stress B = -.54*(SS-S)  
B = -.78*(SS-C) 
B = -.39 (SS-S)  
B = -.62*(SS-C) 
  
          
            Unstandardized beta coefficient 
in single predictor linear 
regression. 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 











991 SS-S Health 
(dichotomized: 
poor/good) 
r = .20*          
  
OR = 1.19* 
 
Age, sex, ethnicity, 
marital status 
n/a 
     Activities of 
Daily Living 
(ADL) 




     Instrumental 
ADL 
r = .17*           OR = 1.22* Smoking, alcohol use, 
depression score 
n/a 
     Physical 
activity 
r = .17*           OR = 1.21*   
      (Spearman's correlations) Odds of having better self-rated 
health and better instrumental 
ADL and physical activity with 











Mean: 39 1193 SS-US Physical health 
(dichotomized 
poor/good) 
OR = .71*(SS-US) 
OR = .80*(SS-C) 
OR = .89*(SS-CO) 
OR = .87 (SS-US) 
OR = .96 (SS-C) 
OR = 1.00 (SS-CO) 
Age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, nativity 








OR = .71*(SS-US) 
OR = .76*(SS-C) 
OR = .89 (SS-CO) 
OR = .93 (SS-US) 
OR = .96 (SS-C) 




    SS-CO Depression 
(dichotomized: 
present or not) 
OR = .75*(SS-US) 
OR = .74*(SS-C) 
OR = .90 (SS-CO) 
OR = 1.11 (SS-US) 
OR = .78 (SS-C) 
OR = 1.08 (SS-CO) 
Health insurance n/a 
     Anxiety 
(dichotomized: 
present or not) 
OR = .85*(SS-US) 
OR = .83*(SS-C) 
OR = .91 (SS-CO) 
OR = 1.10 (SS-US) 
OR = .85 (SS-C) 
OR = .99 (SS-CO) 
Discrimination, social 
support (family and 
friends) 
n/a 
      Lower odds of good self-rated 
physical and emotional health 
with lower subjective status, 
controlling for age and gender. 
Lower odds of good self-rated 
physical and emotional health 
with lower subjective status. 
Lower odds of the presence of 
Immigration stress 
(acculturation), years 
living in US 
n/a 
SUBJECTIVE STATUS, DEPRESSION, AND NEUROTICISM      103 
 










variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
Lower odds of the presence of 
depression and anxiety with 
higher subjective status, 
controlling for age and gender. 
depression and anxiety with 
















OR = 4.52*(M)  
OR = 4.10*(W) 
OR = 2.36*(M) 
OR = 3.22*(W) 
Parental education 
level 
r = .21(M) 
r = .27(W)  
     Psychological 
distress 
(dichotomized: 
present in 4 or 
more 
symptoms) 
OR = 7.16*(M) 
OR = 2.64*(W) 
OR = 5.93*(M)  
OR = 2.51*(W) 
Parental employment 
status (higher numbers 
mean both parents are 
unemployed) 
r = -.23(M) 
r =  -.13(W)  
     Health 
complaints 
(dichotomized: 
present in 4 or 
more health 
complaints) 
OR = 3.20*(M) 
OR = 3.46*(W) 
OR = 2.43 (M)  
OR = 3.56*(W) 
School performance r = .11(M) 
r = .13(W)  
      Higher odds of good self-rated 
health in the highest relative to 
the lowest SS group. Higher odds 
of psychological distress and 
health complaints in the lowest 
relative to the highest SS group. 
Higher odds of good self-rated 
health in the highest relative to 
the lowest SS group. Higher odds 
of psychological distress and 
health complaints in the lowest 
relative to the highest SS group. 
Pocket money r = .17(M) 
r =.14(W)  
Kraus, Adler, 
& Chen (2013) 






300 SS-S Health r = .42* b = .41* Age n/a 
     Physical health r = .17* b = .25* Gender n/a 
     Emotional 
health 
r = .29* b = .36* Ethnicity n/a 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
     Chronic 
negative affect 
r = -.21* b = -.28* Income n/a 
     Depression r = -.36* b = -.42* Education n/a 
        (1) Neutral vs. negative 
condition 
n/a 
        (2) Sad vs. shame 
condition 
n/a 
        Interaction SS x (1) n/a 











1451 SS-US Mood 
Dysfunction 
B = -.13* (SS-US) B = -.31* (SS-US) Age, gender, marital 
status, ethnicity,  
 n/a 
    SS-C+  B = -.10 (SS-C) B = -.23* (SS-C) Education, income n/a 
      Unstandardized beta coefficients 
in LR predicting the presence of 
mood dysfunction with higher 
SS. 
Unstandardized beta coefficients 
in LR predicting the presence of 
mood dysfunction with lower SS 
controlling for all control 
variables and the interaction term 















795 SS-S+ Health  
 
r = .25* (partial correlation) n/a Age, gender n/a 
      Correlation between SS and self-
rated health, controlling for age 
and sex. 
b = .16* Perceived control partial r = .25* 
       b = .15* Self-esteem partial r = .33* 
       n/a Optimism partial r = .06 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
       b = .22*     Cynicism partial r = -.17* 
       b = .23* Shame partial r = -.15* 
       b = .14* Depression  partial r = -.30* 
       b = .16* Hopelessness partial r = -.32* 
       b = .16* Sense of coherence partial r = .28* 
       b = .20* Trust partial r = .28* 
              b = .12* Mastery partial r = .33* 
       b = .11* Vital exhaustion partial r = -.29* 
       All beta refer to the relation of SS 
to self-rated health when each of 
the psychosocial variable was 
added to the model in isolation 











of US adults 
Mean: 
45.5 
1294 SS-US Health r = .31* b = .17* Age r = .06* 
        Sex (male = 0, female 
= 1) 
r = -.07* 
        Ethnicity (white = 0, 
non-white = 1) 
r = -.12* 
        Education r = .37* 
        Income r = .39* 
        High blood pressure r = -.08* 
        Heart attack/heart 
problems 
r = -.02 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 















Health r = .37* W,  
r =.31* C,  
r = .24* L,  
r =.19* A 
b = .31* W,  
b = .29* C,  
b = .14 L,  
b = .14 A 
Education r = .32* W  
r = .22* C 
r = .02 L 
r = .02 A 
      Correlations and regression 
coefficients were computed for 
each ethnic group separately.         
W = White,       C = Chinese,      
L = Latin,          A = African 
 Household income r = .60* W 
r = .54* C 
r = .39* L 








wanting to quit 
in the US 
Mean: 
41.2 
341 SS-S Depression n/a B = -.97* Age, gender, ethnicity, 
relationship status 
n/a 
     Stress n/a B = -.07* Education, income, 
employment status 
n/a 
     Positive affect n/a B = 1.32*   
     Negative affect n/a B = -1.80*   
     Smoking 
abstinence 
n/a B = .21* (1 week post quit)  


















105 SS-S Depression r = -.12 t  = -1.91 Ethnicity n/a 
     Stress r = -.14 t  = -1.82 Education n/a 
SUBJECTIVE STATUS, DEPRESSION, AND NEUROTICISM      107 
 










variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
     Positive affect r = .30* t  = 3.49* Income n/a 
     Negative affect r = -.19* t  = -2.09* Relationship status (in 
couple or not) 
n/a 



















present in more 
than 5 
symptoms) 
OR = 2.61*(M) 
OR = 1.83 (W)  
OR = 1.48 (M)  
OR = 2.47*(W)  
Age n/a 
      Higher odds of having 
psychological distress in the 
lowest SS group relative to the 
highest SS group. 
Higher odds of having 
psychological distress in the 
lowest SS group relative to the 
highest SS group. 
Marital status n/a 
        Education r = .23 










93 SS-PG+ Psychological 
distress 
r = -.40* b = -.18  In-group identification r = .65* 
     Stress r = -.54* b = -.30*    
     Job satisfaction r = .45* b = .19    










113 SS-FC+ Depression r = -.27* b = -.15  In-group identification 
(family belongingness) 
r = .43* 
     Life satisfaction r = .45* b = .31*    
     Stress r = -.29* b = -.17    
SUBJECTIVE STATUS, DEPRESSION, AND NEUROTICISM      108 
 










variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 














OR = 4.16*(M) 
OR = 3.76*(W) 
OR = 2.28*(M)  
OR = 3.37*(W) 
Age n/a 
     Depression 
(dichotomized: 
present in 5 or 
more 
symptoms) 
OR = 1.78*(M)  
OR = 2.65*(W) 
OR = 1.48 (M)  
OR = 4.55*(W) 
Personal income r = .48* 
      Higher odds of having good 
health in the highest relative to 
the lowest SS categories, 
controlling for age and life 
satisfaction. Higher odds of 
having depression in the lowest 
relative to the highest SS 
categories, controlling for age 
and life satisfaction. 
Higher odds of having good 
health in the highest relative to 
the lowest SS categories. Higher 
odds of having depression in the 
lowest relative to the highest SS 
categories. 
Education r =  .41* 
        Employment grade  r =  .60* 
        Life satisfaction r = .33* 
Singh-Manoux, 
Marmot, & 









b = -.19*(M)  
b = -.18*(W) 
b = -.21*(M) 
b = -.22*(W) 
Age n/a 
     Health  b = .25*(M)  
b = .24*(W) 
b = .24*(M)  
b = .21*(W) 
Employment grade  n/a 
      Standardized beta coefficients 
adjusted for age. 












1809 SS-US Health  n/a B = .06* Age, ethnicity, number 
of children 
n/a 
     Depression n/a B = -.17* Mother's education r = .45*W 
r = .40*A/P 
r =  .27*L 
r = .25*A 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 
SS & control 
variables 
        Income r =.53*W 
r = .49*A/P 
r =  .37*L 
r = .24*A 
 
        Public assistance r = -.24*W 
r = -.22*A/P 
r = -.19*L 
r = -.18*A 
 
        Material deprivation r = -.24*W 
r = -.21*A/P 
r = -.22*L 
r = -.19*A 
 
                  W = White 
A/P = Asian / 
Pacific Islander 
L = Latin 














1571 SS-US  Depression B = -1.68*(M) (SS-US) 
B = -1.59*(W) (SS-US)  
B = -1.45*(M) (SS-C) 
B = -1.66*(W) (SS-C) 
B = -1.10*(M) (SS-US) 
B = -1.08*(W) (SS-US)  
B = -1.10*(M) (SS-C) 
B = -1.31*(W) (SS-C) 
Age n/a 
    SS-C+ Stress B = .14 (M) (SS-US) 
B = .11 (W) (SS-US)  
B = -.18 (M) (SS-C) 
B = .10 (W) (SS-C) 
B = .12 (M) (SS-US) 
B = .07 (W) (SS-US)  
B = -.18 (M) (SS-C) 
B = .18*(W) (SS-C) 
Education (SS-US) 
r = .16*(M)  
r = .10*(W)  
(SS-C) 
r = .05*(M)  
r = .01 (W) 
      Unstandardized beta coefficients, 
adjusted for age. 
 Income (SS-US) 
r = .17*(M)  
r = .16*W  
(SS-C) 
r = .11*(M)  
r = .03 (W)  
              Lifetime discrimination (SS-US) 
r = -.03 (M)  
r = -.06*(W)  
(SS-C)  
r = -.00 (M)  








3644 SS-US Health 
(dichotomized: 
r = 0.26* (SS-US) OR = 4.29* (SS-US) Age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, 
household size, health 
n/a 
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variables Raw relation btwn SS & outcome 
Relation btwn SS & outcome, 
accounting for control variables Control variables 
Relation btwn 





sample   poor/good) insurance 
        SS-E  r = 0.22* (SS-E) OR =.54 (SS-E) Household income r = 0.37*(SS- 
US) 
    SS-N  r = 0.16* (SS-N) OR =.99 (SS-N) Education r =.38*(SS- 
US) 
    SS-P  r = 0.18* (SS-P) OR = 1.58 (SS-P) Home ownership r =.18*(SS- 
US) 
    (5 
categories 
in each) 
  Odds of having good health in the 
highest SS category for each 
different SS, relative to the 
middle SS category (same as), 
controlling for all SS variables, 
control variables, and the 
interaction btwn ethnicity and SS. 
Depression (presence 
or absence) 
r = -.18*(SS- 
US)   
 
        Bipolar disorder 
(presence or absence) 
r =  -.09* (SS-
A)  
        Anxiety disorder 
(presence or absence) 
r = -.10* (SS-
A)  
        Physical health 
conditions (diabetes, 
skin cancer, other 
cancer, high 





with SS- US) 
Note. Unless specified otherwise, higher numbers for each variable signify more of the construct (e.g., for pessimism, higher numbers indicate more pessimism; 
for subjective status, higher numbers indicate higher subjective status). Unless otherwise specified, subjective status was assessed with a 10 rung ladder and was 
explicitly defined in terms of education, income, and occupation. All correlations are Pearson correlations, unless specified otherwise. In studies with more than 
one outcome variable for which the sample size varied depending on the outcome variable, the lowest sample size was recorded in the table. Health refers to 
overall self-rated health. Physical health refers to self-rated physical health. Emotional health refers to self-rated emotional or mental health. Unless otherwise 
specified, stress is self-rated. b = standardized beta coefficient. B = unstandardized beta coefficient. OR = Odds ratio. r = correlation. t = t-statistic 
(unstandardized regression coefficient of an independent variable divided by its standard error). γ = Goodman and Kruskal's gamma (rank correlation). LR = 
Logistic regression. M = Men. W = Women. SES = Socio-economic status. SS = Subjective status. SS-C = Subjective status in the community. SS-CO = 
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Subjective status in country of origin. SS-E = Subjective status in relation to one's own ethnic group. SS-FC = Family’s subjective status in the community. SS-
FS = Family’s subjective status in society. SS-J = Subjective status in Japan, using a 5 strata. SS-N = Subjective status compared to "neighbours". SS-OP = 
Subjective status compared to "other people". SS-P = Subjective status compared to own parents at the same age. SS-PG = Subjective status of own professional 
group compared to other professional groups in society. SS-S = Subjective status compared to society. SS-SC = Subjective status in the school setting. SS-US = 
Subjective status in relation to the United States population (or American society). + no reference to education, income, and occupation. * p < .05. 
 
 
